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Abstract
We introduce a structural model of procurement auctions with incomplete con-
tracts, where a procurer chooses an initial project specification endogenously. The
contract between the procurer and the winner of the auction is incomplete in that
the two parties may agree to adopt a new feasible specification later, and negotiate
an additional transfer via Nash Bargaining where both parties’ disagreement val-
ues depend on the auction price. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, contractors
competing in the auction take account of such incompleteness while quoting prices.
We show that the model primitives are non-parametrically identified and propose
a feasible estimation procedure. Using data from highway procurement auctions in
California, we estimate the structural elements that determine the hold-up due to
incompleteness, and infer how a contractor’s bargaining power and the mark-up in
the price quoted vary with its characteristics and the features of the construction
project. We also find that ignoring the existence of contract incompleteness in the
structural analysis of the bidding data leads to substantial over-estimation of the
mark-ups in the prices.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes an empirical framework for analyzing the strategic interaction
between the buyer (procurer) and the sellers (contractors) in procurement auctions with
incomplete contracts. In particular, we focus on the situation where the contractual in-
completeness is associated with the procurer’s endogenous choice of an initial specification
for the contract. Our work is partly motivated by the seminal work in Tirole (2009), which
introduced a model where contractual incompleteness arises as the buyer chooses an op-
timal level of cognitive effort to learn about the appropriate design. The optimal level
of effort is determined by weighing the marginal costs of the effort against the marginal
benefits (e.g., those from avoiding a hold-up in the post-contractual negotiation).
Summary of the Model and Contribution We extend the model in Tirole (2009)
to an environment where the initial contract price is determined via the competitive bid-
ding among contractors. In our model, a procurer announces an initial specification for
the contract, and the interested contractors compete via a first-price sealed-bid auction.
Both the contractors and the procurer are aware that a new feasible specification is to be
realized after the auction, which may supplant the initial design if it leads to a positive
net incremental surplus. In case a new design is adopted, the procurer negotiates with the
winner and makes a transfer in addition to the auction price based on the initial design.
The size of the transfer is determined by a Nash Bargaining solution. Furthermore, the
auction price based on the initial specification affects the negotiation outcome through
its impact on the disagreement values of both parties. Both the procurer and the con-
tractors take this into account in their strategic decisions prior to and during the auction.
The hold-up on the procurer in this model is defined as the negotiated share of the net
incremental surplus paid to the winner of the auction.1
Apart from the procurer’s endogenous choice of the initial specification, our model
includes some distinctive features not present in the existing empirical literature (e.g.,
Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014)). First, we use a Nash Bargaining solution to ac-
count for post-auction negotiation outcomes. Second, we maintain a flexible assumption
on the information available to the agents. Prior to the auction, a procurer observes a
private noisy signal correlated with the feasible new design in the future and chooses an ini-
tial specification to maximize its ex ante payoff. The contractors also do not have perfect
foresight of the new design, and quote prices strategically based on the initial specification
by taking account of their potential gain from the hold-up due to the adoption of the new
design. Third, due to the sequential moves of the procurer and contractors, we adopt a
new equilibrium concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in the structural anal-
1Our model is in line with Tirole (2009) in the sense that the incompleteness of a contract originated
in the buyer’s pre-contract choices. In Tirole’s case it is the level of cognitive effort; in ours it is the initial
specification. However, unlike in Tirole (2009), the cause for contractual incompleteness in our model
lies in the procurer’s uncertainty about the new feasible design (as it only observes a noisy signal). We
do not adopt Tirole’s approach to endogenize the procurer’s cognitive effort and tie it to incompleteness.
This is mostly due to empirical and identification concerns. In procurement auctions, the data typically
do not report any proxy measure of the procurer’s cognitive effort or its costs.
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ysis. We characterize and establish the existence of symmetric monotone pure-strategy
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (psPBE) in such a model.
To fill the gap between theory and empirical analyses, we provide original constructive
arguments to non-parametrically identify the structural elements in the model. We also
propose a feasible estimation procedure that is based on the identification argument and
mild parametrization. We then use it to estimate the determinants of the hold-up problem
inflicted on the procurer in post-contractual (post-auction) negotiation, and to infer how a
contractor’s mark-up varies with its characteristics as well as the features of the contract.
Overview of the Identification Approach The model primitives to be recovered
from the data include the bargaining power of the procurer against contractors in post-
auction negotiation, the incremental cost and surplus which depend on the initial and
the new specification, and the contractors’ private cost distribution. We show that under
the assumption of psPBE, these elements can be non-parametrically identified from the
information reported in a typical empirical environment. That is, the joint distribution
of the initial specification, the auction price, the final design adopted, as well as the
negotiated post-auction transfer.
Several structural links between the primitives and the data are instrumental for iden-
tifying the model: (a) a first-order condition that characterizes the procurer’s optimal
choice; (b) an equilibrium condition that delineates contractors’ bidding strategies; and
(c) the relation between the negotiated transfer and model elements that determine the
size of the hold-up (that is, the bargaining power and the incremental cost and surplus
functions). Our identification argument takes several steps. First, we exploit the link
in (c) to recast (a) in the form of an ordinary differential equation in the incremental
surplus function. We show that the form of the differential equation is fully determined
by quantities directly identifiable from the data. This allows us to recover the incremental
surplus function using a boundary condition. Then, with a flexible shape restriction on
the incremental cost function, we identify the bargaining power and the cost function from
the negotiated transfer using the link in (c). Next, using (b) and a standard argument
for identifying bidders’ value distribution in a first-price auction by Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2000), we back out the contractors’ inverse bidding strategies up to a “cost
adjustment” term. This term reflects how the contractors adjust their strategic behavior
in competitive bidding, knowing that additional gains are possible from the post-auction
negotiation. With the quantities already recovered from the preceding steps, this adjust-
ment term is identified. It then follows that the contractors’ full bidding strategy, and
consequently the private cost distribution, is identified.
Our method is original in that it fully exploits the procurer’s optimization incentives
in (a) and the characterization of the negotiated transfer as a Nash Bargaining solution
in (c) in our model, where classical arguments based on (b) are insufficient for the full
identification due to the existence of contractual incompleteness. We also extend our
approach to identify a model of incomplete contracts where there is no pre-contract com-
petition among contractors and the payment to the sole seller is determined via a bilateral
negotiation as opposed to an auction.
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Preview of Empirical Findings We apply our model to study the strategic incentives
of the procurers and contractors in auctions of highway procurement contracts held by
California’s Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Our goals are to understand how
contractor characteristics and contract heterogeneity affect the bargaining power and the
additional transfer in post-auction negotiation; to infer how the incremental surplus and
costs depend on the initial and new specifications; to find out the size of the mark-up in
the prices quoted by contractors; and to learn about the determinants of the hold-up for
the procurer.
While implementing the estimation, we incorporate contractor and project hetero-
geneity in the incremental cost and surplus and the bargaining power. The parameters
in these objects are estimated via a two-stage extremum estimator, using the variation in
the negotiated transfers reported in the data. We then use these estimates to infer the
cost distribution of contractors from the prices quoted.
Our first set of empirical results reveal the determinants of contractors’ bargaining
power. We find that on average a winning contractor’s bargaining power is significantly
higher than that of the procurer, and it is higher for the winners from auctions involving
more contractors. Furthermore, the winner from an auction has a higher bargaining
power against the procurer if the auction has a higher proportion of non-fringe firms
among the competing contractors, or if the average utilization rate (defined as the ratio
of a contractor’s backlog over its capacity) is higher among the contractors in the auction.
We also classify the contracts into “major” projects that require more substantive
reconstruction and relatively “minor” ones. We find that the procurer has a signifi-
cantly higher bargaining power for major projects (about 12% higher than that in minor
projects). This could be because the procurer is more likely to play hardball in post-
auction negotiations if the contract involves a major project (either because the winning
contractor cares about the long-term relation with the procurer, or because there are more
tax-payer’s money and larger social surplus at stake).
Our estimates suggest that the social surplus function is convex, thus offering some
evidence for an economy of scale in how larger projects benefit a greater population. The
estimates also show that larger transfers are often associated with projects involving more
substantial post-auction modification.
We estimate the private costs of contractors and the mark-ups in their quotes. The
overall average mark-up is estimated to be around 9%. We find that the mark-ups increase
sharply as the number of bidders decreases. Our estimates also show that the auction
winners tend to have substantial cost advantage over other competitors, which allow
them to win with high mark-ups. Interestingly, the mark-ups are lower for contractors in
major projects and this may be due to their smaller bargaining power in these projects
as mentioned in the previous results. Last but not least, we find that ignoring how
contractors respond strategically to contractual incompleteness in the auctions leads to a
substantial over-estimation of actual markups in their quoted prices.
Relation to Existing Literature A wide array of theoretical models of incomplete
contracts have been used to study employment relation (Simon (1951), Klein, Crawford,
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and Alchian (1978)), ownership and the property-rights of firm (Williamson (1985), Gross-
man and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), and international trade (Spencer (2005)).
The model we introduce in this paper differs qualitatively from those in these papers.
In particular, we extend the model in Tirole (2009) to an environment where the initial
contract price is determined via the competitive bidding between contractors.
This paper also contributes to a broader literature on the identification of structural
models in auction and contract theory. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) proposed
a structural mapping between bidders’ valuations and their bids in first-price auctions
and used it as a basis for identifying the distribution of bidders’ private values. Some
recent papers that study the identification of models related to the contract theory (e.g.,
d’Haultfoeuille and Fe´vrier (2007), Aryal, Perrigne, and Vuong (2010), Perrigne and
Vuong (2011) and Perrigne and Vuong (2012)) build their argument around the map-
ping between the unobserved agent type and the features of the contracts reported in the
data (e.g., the price and the package offered in the contracts). In comparison, we propose
new identification arguments that explore the procurer’s optimization incentives and the
characterization of the negotiated transfer in a Nash Bargaining solution in a model where
classical arguments based on bidders’/contractors’ incentives alone would be insufficient
for full recovery of model primitives.
In addition, our paper contributes to a fast-growing empirical literature on post-
auction bargaining (e.g., Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel, and Vuong (1997) and Larsen (2014))
and contractual incompleteness in a variety of environments (e.g., Crocker and Reynolds
(1993), Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009) and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014)).
Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) used the same source of data as ours to estimate
the adaptation costs due to contract incompleteness. In comparison, our model differs
from theirs in several fundamental aspects. We model the post-auction negotiation via
a Nash Bargaining solution; allow endogenous choices of initial specification which affect
ex post contractual incompleteness; and accommodate more flexible assumptions on the
information available to agents. (See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion.) Our new
model demands a qualitatively different methodology for identification and estimation.
Using our model, we are able to infer how the key determinants of the hold-up (incremen-
tal costs and surplus, contractor’s bargaining power) depend on contractor characteristics
and project heterogeneity. Our findings in Section 5 provide new evidence as to how agents
respond strategically to the presence of contractual incompleteness, and what determines
the size of the hold-up in highway procurement projects.
Roadmap In Sections 2 we introduce our model of procurement auctions of incomplete
contracts with an endogenous initial specification, and characterize its pure-strategy Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium. In Section 3 we establish the main identification results, and
then extend the argument to the case of incomplete contracts with bilateral negotiations
in Section 4. In Section 5 we propose a feasible estimation procedure based on the iden-
tification arguments and apply it to analyze California highway procurement contracts.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs and tables are collected in the appendix.
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2 The Model and Equilibrium
A buyer (or procurer) holds a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction among N
sellers (or contractors). First, the procurer announces an initial contract specification
X ∈ X ⊂ R. Upon learning X, each contractor i draws a private cost Ci for completing
the contract under this specification, and quotes a price (a bid) Pi ∈ R+. The procurer
awards the contract to the contractor that quotes the lowest price (a.k.a. the “winner”).
For any initial specification X, the contractors’ costs are drawn independently from a
continuous distribution FC|X with support C ⊂ R+, which may depend on X. For generic
random vectors R and R′, let FR′|R and fR′|R denote the conditional distribution and
density of R′ given R respectively, and write them as FR′|R=r and fR′|R=r in order to be
specific with the value conditioned on. A random variable is denoted by upper cases while
its realized values are denoted by lower cases.
In contrast to a standard procurement auction, the contract we consider in this model
contains an incompleteness pact. The specification of the contract is subject to a possible
modification to a new design X∗ 6= X after the auction is concluded (that is, after a
winner is chosen to execute the contract under the initial specification X). The new
design X∗ is not known ex ante to the procurer or any contractor, and is thus considered
uncertain when the procurer announces X and the contractors quote prices. The private
costs Ci for completing the initial specification are independent from X
∗ once conditional
on X.
We model the occurrence of contractual incompleteness as follows. Let pi(X) ∈ R
be the social surplus under a specification X, and let a(X,X∗) ∈ R be the incremental
cost when the specification is changed from X to X∗. The incremental cost may involve
additional construction as well as logistic work, and we assume it is non-separable in
X and X∗ to allow for the possibility that the marginal costs depend on both X and
X∗; on the other hand the incremental surplus by definition is just the difference of
surplus between two specifications and it is separable in X and X∗, i.e., φ(X,X∗) ≡
pi(X∗)− pi(X). Once X∗ is realized following the auction, the procurer and the winner in
the auction will agree to use the incompleteness pact and adopt the new design X∗ if and
only if this yields a net incremental surplus relative to the initial specification (that is,
s(X,X∗) ≡ φ(X,X∗)− a(X,X∗) > 0).2 The incompleteness of a contract is measured by
the probability that the initial specification X is altered to be X∗ such that s(X,X∗) > 0.
If X∗ is adopted, the procurer and the winner negotiate further transfer between
them in addition to the contract price initially quoted by the winner. In our model,
the auction price affects the post-auction negotiation outcomes through its impact on the
disagreement values of both parties in the Nash Bargaining solution. The contractor covers
the incremental costs upfront as they arise in construction.3 The incremental surplus is
2More generally, our identification and estimation method applies when the occurrence of incomplete-
ness follows a general rule that depends on X, X∗ and other variables reported in the data.
3In some contracts, the procurer, rather than the contractor, covers the incremental costs up front.
In this case, the negotiated transfer from the procurer to the contractor equals the contractor’s share of
the net incremental surplus φ− a, which must be proportional to the latter’s bargaining power in a Nash
Bargaining solution. Our method in this paper can be readily extended to these contracts.
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eventually accrued to the procurer. Both parties take these into account as they negotiate
the transfers through a Nash Bargaining process. Specifically, let y(X,X∗) ∈ R denote
the negotiated transfer from the procurer to the winner. To simplify notation we suppress
the input argument (X,X∗) in y, φ, a, s below. Let 1−γ ∈ (0, 1) be a constant parameter
reflecting the procurer’s bargaining power.4 The negotiated transfer determined by the
Nash Bargaining solution is such that the auction winner eventually obtains a share of the
net incremental surplus proportional to its bargaining power (see Appendix A for details).
That is,
y − a = γs⇔ y = γφ+ (1− γ)a.
On the other hand, there is no negotiated transfer (y = 0) if no new design is adopted.
Prior to announcing the initial specification, the procurer observes a signal X˜ ∈ X
that is correlated with X∗. Denote the distribution of X∗ conditional on X˜ by FX∗|X˜ .
The model elements γ, pi, a, FC|X and FX∗|X˜ are common knowledge among the procurer
and the contractors. On the other hand, realized values for X˜ and Ci remain private
information for the procurer and contractor i respectively. At the beginning of the auction,
the procurer announces an X that maximizes its ex ante payoff, based on its signal X˜.
A contractor then observes X, draws its private cost Ci from FC|X and quotes a price to
maximize its ex ante profit, which includes the negotiated transfer to be realized.
A leading example for auctions of incomplete contract is the highway procurement auc-
tions in California (see Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014)). Caltrans is a government
department in the State of California that is responsible for the planning, construction,
and maintenance of public transportation facilities such as highway, bridge, and rails.
It awards highway construction projects to contractors through first-price procurement
auctions. Before a procurement auction, Caltrans announces an engineers’ estimate X
for the cost of the project. These estimates are essentially the initial specification, condi-
tional on which the contractors calculate their initial projected costs. (In the data used
in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), these engineers’ estimates are reported in terms
of the quantity for each category of inputs and their per-unit prices.)
Once the engineers’ estimate is announced, the set of auction participants who are
interested in the contract draw their private costs for completing the project and quote
their prices. The contractor bidding the lowest price is awarded the contract. The con-
tracts are typically incomplete, and post-contractual modifications such as extra work,
adjustment, and deduction are often reported. Both parties are aware of this incomplete-
ness pact and take it into account while quoting the prices or announcing the engineers’
estimates. In a majority of the cases, Caltrans and the winner of the auction end up
adopting a new specification X∗ that differs from X. In such cases, additional transfers
(in the form of adjustment, deduction or payment for extra work) are made between the
two parties through negotiation.
4The bargaining power of the procurer against the winner may in general depend on auction-level
characteristics. While we focus on homogeneous auctions in this section to simplify exposition, our iden-
tification results in this section could be generalized conditional on observed auction-level heterogeneity.
In the empirical application, we estimate a model with heterogeneous auctions.
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For the rest of this section, we characterize and discuss the existence of symmetric
monotone pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (psPBE) in this model. For now we
maintain that the number of contractors in an auction N is common knowledge among
the procurer and contractors at the bidding stage. Nonetheless, as explained later in
the identification section, our results apply to the case where contractors’ participation
decisions are exogenous and N is not unknown to both the procurer and the contractors.
A contractor i’s pure strategy maps from his information (Ci, X) to a quoted price;
a procurer’s pure strategy maps from a signal X˜ to an initial announcement X. Let
s+ ≡ max{s, 0}. A symmetric psPBE in this model is a pair of procurer strategy α∗ and
contractor strategy β∗ such that (a) for all (x, ci),
β∗(ci, x) = arg max
p∈R+
Pr
(
min
j 6=i
β∗(Cj, X) ≥ p
∣∣∣∣X = x){p− ci + δ¯(x;α∗)} , (1)
where δ¯(x;α∗) ≡ E[γs+(X,X∗)|X = x;α∗] is a contractor’s ex ante share of the negotiated
net incremental surplus; (b) the expectation in δ¯ is conditional on the initial specification
x, and with respect to a belief about X∗ that is consistent with FX∗|X˜ and α
∗ (explained
below); and (c) α∗ is the procurer’s best response when all contractors follow β∗:
α∗(x˜) = arg max
x∈X
{pi(x)− ψ(x; β∗) + µ(x, x˜)} (2)
where ψ(x; β∗) is the procurer’s ex ante payment (that is, the price quoted by the auc-
tion winner) when contractors follow symmetric pure-strategy β∗ and µ(x, x˜) ≡ E[(1 −
γ)s+(x,X
∗) | X˜ = x˜]. (See Appendix B for the closed-form of ψ.) The last term µ(x, x˜) is
a procurer’s ex ante payoff due to contractual incompleteness. The expectation in µ(x, x˜)
is taken with respect to X∗ according to FX∗|X˜=x˜ when the initial specification X is fixed
at x. In a monotone symmetric psPBE, α∗ is increasing over X and β∗ is increasing over
C for any x ∈ X . In this case, the consistency of the contractors’ belief in equilibrium
means FX∗|X=x(x∗) = FX∗|X˜=α∗−1(x)(x
∗) for all x, x∗.
We now provide some heuristic argument for the existence of symmetric monotone
psPBE in the model. (Technical matters such as detailed conditions and the proof are
presented in the appendix.) First off, for any initial announcement x and procurer strat-
egy α, a contractor’s optimization problem is similar to that in a procurement auction
without any incompleteness, except that its private cost is drawn from the distribution of
“adjusted costs” Ci − δ¯(x;α) which depend on x and α. By arguments from the existing
literature (such as Athey (2001); McAdams (2003); Reny (2011)), symmetric monotone
pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria exist in the procurement auction for a given pair
of α and x under regularity conditions.
For a fixed x, let βα denote a contractor’s bidding strategy in a symmetric monotone
Bayesian Nash equilibrium when the procurer adopts a monotone procurer strategy α.
Recall that α affects contractors’ bidding strategies via its impact on their equilibrium
belief, which enters δ¯(x;α). For any x and α, let ϕ(x;α) ≡ ψ(x; βα) denote the pro-
curer’s expected payment when contractors follow the strategy βα. Then in a psPBE the
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procurer’s strategy α∗ is characterized by the solution to a fixed-point equation:
α∗(x˜) = arg max
x∈X
{pi(x) + µ(x, x˜)− ϕ(x;α∗)} . (3)
A symmetric monotone psPBE exists if this fixed-point mapping admits a solution α∗
that is monotone over X . Assuming smoothness of pi, µ, ϕ in x and existence of interior
solutions, the first-order condition for the maximization problem in (3) evaluated at the
procurer’s equilibrium strategy takes the form of an ordinary differential equation (ODE)
in α∗. The form of the ODE is determined by {pi, a, γ, FC|X , FX∗|X˜}. Thus proving
the existence and uniqueness of symmetric monotone psPBE boil down to proving the
existence and uniqueness of the solution to this ODE.
Using existing theory on ODE, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a global
solution α∗ in (3) that is increasing over X under appropriate conditions. The existence
and uniqueness of the solution require that the function characterizing the derivative
of α∗ in the ODE satisfy a Lipschitz condition in the initial announcement. The suffi-
cient conditions for a monotone solution include the assumption that FC|X is first-order
stochastically increasing in X.
3 Identification
In this section we show how the elements of the model can be identified when the
data report the price quoted by the winner in the procurement auction (V ), the initial
specification (X), as well as the final design adopted (X∗) and the negotiated transfer
(Y ) if the new design is adopted. We maintain that the data are rationalized by a single
symmetric monotone psPBE {α∗, β∗}. Results in this section can be extended to accom-
modate contract heterogeneity reported in the data. Our argument below is conditional
on the number of bidders N , which is suppressed from the notation for simplicity. Let D
be a dummy variable such that D = 1 if there is a negotiated transfer in a contract due
to the adoption of a new design.
First off, we show that at best the model can only be identified up to a monotone
transformation of the procurer’s signal. We say two models are observationally equivalent
if they imply the same distribution of V, Y,D,X and X∗ in symmetric psPBE. Suppose
the actual data-generating process is θ ≡ {γ, pi, a, FC|X , FX∗,X˜}. Consider an alternative
model θ0 ≡ {γ0, pi0, a0, HC|X , HX∗,X˜} such that (i) a = a0, pi = pi0 and γ = γ0; (ii)
FC|X=x = HC|X=x for all x ∈ X ; and (iii) FX∗,X˜(x, x˜) = HX∗,X˜(x, h(x˜)) for all x, x˜ and
some increasing and differentiable function h : X → T ⊆ R. In other words, the procurer’s
private signal prior to auctions in θ0 is an increasing and differentiable transformation of
the actual signal X˜ in θ. Note the support of the private signal in θ0 (denoted T ) is
allowed to differ from that in θ.
Lemma 1 (Observable Equivalence) θ and θ0 are observationally equivalent.
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Proof of the lemma is presented in the appendix. For a single-agent model with a non-
additive monotone outcome function, Matzkin (2003) showed some scale normalization
of unobserved shocks is necessary for nonparametric identification.5 In comparison, we
show in Lemma 1 that normalizing the distribution of procurers’ private signals is also
necessary for identifying the richer game-theoretic model we introduce, where the vector of
actions (X,X∗) and outcome V,D, Y reported in the data are rationalized by the strategic
interaction between contractors and the procurer in equilibrium.6
Lemma 1 suggests that we need to impose at least some normalization of the signal X˜
in order to identify the model.7 In what follows, we normalize the marginal distribution FX˜
to a standard uniform without loss of generality. Let Xe ≡ {x : x = α∗(x˜) for some x˜ ∈ X}
denote the support of X in equilibrium. For each x, define ω(x) ≡ {x∗ ∈ X : s(x, x∗) > 0}.
Lemma 2 (Procurer’s Strategy) α∗ is identified over the support of X˜. For all x ∈
Xe, the distribution of X∗ conditional on X∗ ∈ ω(x) and X˜ = α∗−1(x) is identified from
the distribution of (X∗, D) conditional on X = x.
Proof. Let {α∗, β∗} denote the symmetric, monotone psPBE in the data-generating
process; and let xτ denote the τ -th quantile of the initial specification X that is identifiable
from the data. Recall that we normalize FX˜ to be a standard uniform distribution over
(0, 1).8 Then the procurer’s strategy is identified as α∗(τ) = xτ . The monotonicity of α∗
then implies that X = xτ if and only if X˜ = τ . Hence, we have
FX∗|X∗∈ω(xτ ),X˜=τ (x
∗) = Pr{X∗ ≤ x∗ | X˜ = τ, s(xτ , X∗) > 0}
= Pr{X∗ ≤ x∗ | X = xτ , D = 1}
for all x∗ ∈ X and τ ∈ (0, 1). 
More generally, we may normalize FX˜ to any increasing, differentiable C.D.F. F0 and
let x˜τ denote the τ -th quantile of F0. Then the same argument applies and Pr{X∗ ≤
5Matzkin (2003) considered a nonparametric model Y = m(X, ) where m is monotone in , and 
is independent from X. Lemma 1 in Matzkin (2003) established that, without further restrictions on
m, the model is observationally equivalent to another model Y = m˜(X, ˜) where ˜ is any monotone
transformation of .
6The proof of observational equivalence in our case is qualitatively different from that in Matzkin
(2003). First, we relate the players’ equilibrium strategies in θ to those in θ0. Then, we show that θ and
θ0 imply the same equilibrium distribution of (V, Y,D,X,X
∗).
7Tirole (2009) considered a model of incomplete contracts where both parties may exert cognitive
effort to learn about the appropriate design and how to draft the contract accordingly. In his case, the
pre-contractual decision is to choose the level of information acquisition effort, which is measured by
acquisition costs. In such a model, the full identification of the information structure may be possible if
the endogenous choices of the information acquisition costs as well as the signal for appropriate design
are both reported in the data.
8In the notation leading to Lemma 1, this is equivalent to picking an observationally equivalent model
θ0 by setting h to be the marginal distribution FX˜ in θ.
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x∗ | X˜ = x˜τ , s(xτ , X∗) > 0} is identified as Pr{X∗ ≤ x∗ | X = xτ , D = 1}. Similarly,
the procurer’s strategy is identified as α∗(x˜τ ) = xτ . Once the procurer’s strategy α∗ is
identified, we apply an argument based on Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) to establish
an intermediate result on the identification of contractors’ cost distribution.
Lemma 3 (Contractors’ Strategies) The inverse strategy for contractors is identified
up to δ¯(·;α∗), the ex ante share of the net incremental surplus in equilibrium.
Proof. Given an initial specification x and the procurer’s equilibrium strategy α∗, a
contractor i’s problem in (1) is reparametrized as:
β˜i(c˜i, x;α
∗) = arg max
p∈R+
Pr
{
min
j 6=i
β˜j(C˜j, X;α
∗) ≥ p
∣∣∣∣X = x} (p− c˜i) , (4)
where C˜i ≡ Ci − δ¯(X;α∗) are i.i.d. conditional on x and α∗ for all i. Changing variables
between quoted prices and private costs, we can recover the inverse bidding strategy
β˜−1(·, ·;α∗) in equilibrium in (4) as
β˜−1(p, x;α∗) = p− 1
N − 1
1− FP |X=x(p)
fP |X=x(p)
, (5)
where FP |X=x(p) denotes the conditional distribution of quoted prices. Because the con-
tractors’ private costs are i.i.d. given X, the prices they quote in a symmetric monotone
psPBE are also i.i.d. given X. Thus
1− FV |X =
(
1− FP |X
)N ⇒ FP |X = 1− (1− FV |X) 1N .
Substituting this into (5) and using fP |X=x(p) = ∂∂pFP |X=x(p), we get
β˜−1(p, x;α∗) = p− N
N − 1
1− FV |X=x(p)
fV |X=x(p)
.
By construction Ci = C˜i + δ¯(X;α
∗) and thus
β∗−1(p, x;α∗) = β˜−1(p, x;α∗) + δ¯(x;α∗). (6)
Hence the inverse bidding strategy for contractors in (1) given a procurer strategy α∗ in
the symmetric monotone psPBE is identified up to δ¯(·;α∗). 
The result in Lemma 3 is based on the following fact: with contractual incompleteness,
contractors adopt equilibrium strategies similar to those in a first-price auction, except
that the costs need to be adjusted to take account of the ex ante share of net incremental
surplus via Nash bargaining.
Next, we show how to identify γ, a and pi. This would imply the identification of
δ¯(X;α∗) = E[γs+(X,X∗)|X = x;α∗], and subsequently β∗−1(p, x;α∗) by (6). It would
then follow that the distribution of Ci given X is also identified.
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Assumption 1 (a) The support X is convex. (b) FX∗|x˜ is continuous with positive density
over X for all x˜. (c) pi and a are bounded and continuously differentiable. (d) The
boundary of ω(x) ≡ {x∗ ∈ X : s(x, x∗) > 0} is differentiable in x over the interior of X .
Parts (a)-(c) in Assumption 1 are standard regularity conditions. We exemplify the
restriction in (d) as follows. Suppose ω(x) ⊆ X ⊆ R is partitioned into two disjoint
intervals (ι1(x), ι2(x)), (ι3(x), ι4(x)). Then (d) requires that ιk(x) is differentiable in x for
k = 1, 2, 3, 4 over the interior of X .
We now sketch the argument leading to the identification of pi under Assumption 1.
In a symmetric monotone psPBE, the procurer chooses x to maximize his ex ante return
pi(x)+µ(x, x˜)−ϕ(x;α∗). An interior solution is characterized by the first-order condition:
∂
∂x
[pi(x) + µ(x, x˜)− ϕ(x;α∗)]x=α∗(x˜) = 0 for any x˜
which implies:
ϕ′(z;α∗) = pi′(z) +
∂
∂x
[∫
ω(x)
(1− γ)s(x, t)dFX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)
]
x=z
(7)
for all z on the equilibrium path (i.e. z = α∗(x˜) for some x˜, or equivalently, z ∈ Xe).
The condition (7) essentially equates the marginal payment (cost) in the auction with the
marginal benefit for the procurer at the level of the initial specification z. The right-hand
side of (7) shows that an initial specification affects a procurer’s payoff both through the
gross surplus and through ex ante share of the net incremental surplus.
Recall that the observed transfer from the procurer to the contractor is:
y(x, x∗) = (1− γ)a(x, x∗) + γφ(x, x∗) (8)
for all (x, x∗) such that s(x, x∗) > 0; and is zero otherwise. Using Assumption 1(d), we
combine (7) with (8) to get:
pi′(z) = [1− p(z, α∗−1(z))]−1
(
ϕ′(z;α∗) +
∫
ω(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)dt
)
for all z ∈ Xe
(9)
where p(x, x˜) ≡ Pr{D = 1 | X = x, X˜ = x˜} denotes the probability that the contract is
modified to adopt the new design. (See Appendix C.2 for details.) For any z ∈ Xe, the
density fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t) is identified for all t ∈ ω(z) as
fX∗|X∗∈ω(z),X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)× Pr(X∗ ∈ ω(z)|X = z)
where the first term is identified due to Lemma 2 and the second term is directly identified
as Pr(D = 1 | X = z) from data.
Equation (9) shows how contract incompleteness affects a procurer’s decision. Like
contractors, the procurer also takes into account the post-contractual negotiated transfer
while choosing an initial specification. The right-hand side of (9) consists of quantities
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that are identified from the joint distribution of V , Y , D, X, and X∗ if the new specifica-
tion is adopted. This means we can recover pi up to an innocuous location normalization.
That the location of pi can not be identified is because the contractor and procurer strate-
gies only depend on pi(x∗) − pi(x) and the derivative pi′(·) respectively. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the location of pi by setting pi(x) = 0 with x being the infimum
of Xe. For all x ∈ Xe, the closed-form solution for pi is
pi(x) =
∫ x
x
{
[1− p(z, α∗−1(z))]−1
(
ϕ′(z;α∗) +
∫
ω(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)dt
)}
dz.
Because the integrand is identified for all z on the equilibrium support of X, this means
pi is identified over Xe. To recover γ and a from (8), we maintain the following conditions.
Assumption 2 There exist (x1, x
∗
1) and (x2, x
∗
2) such that x1, x2 ∈ Xe and s(x1, x∗1) > 0,
s(x2, x
∗
2) > 0; and a(x1, x
∗
1) = a(x2, x
∗
2), φ(x1, x
∗
1) 6= φ(x2, x∗2).
This assumption states that in the data-generating process it is possible to witness
two pairs of realized specifications that lead to the same incremental adjustment costs a
but different incremental surplus φ. This restriction holds for many specifications of a
and φ. For example, suppose a(X,X∗) =
∑K
k=0 ak(X
∗ − X)k but pi(X) is a polynomial∑K
k=0 akX
k, K ≥ 2. Then any pairs with x∗1 − x1 = x∗2 − x2 and x1 6= x2 satisfy this
assumption.
Under Assumption 2, y(x1, x
∗
1) − y(x2, x∗2) equals the contractor’s share of the incre-
mental surplus (that is, γ[φ(x2, x
∗
2)−φ(x1, x∗1)]). With pi (and hence φ) already identified,
we can recover γ as the ratio between y(x1, x
∗
1)−y(x2, x∗2) and φ(x2, x∗2)−φ(x1, x∗1). With
γ and pi recovered, the incremental cost a(x, x∗) is then identified from (8) for any x ∈ Xe
and x∗ ∈ ω(x).
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1- 2 hold. Then γ is identified; and FC|X=x, pi(x) and
a(x, x∗) are identified for all x ∈ Xe and x∗ ∈ ω(x).
Note that Assumption 2 only gives one possible condition under which γ and a are
recovered. There exist alternative restrictions that are sufficient for identification. For
example, suppose for some x0 and x
∗
0 the level of the adjustment cost is known: a(x0, x
∗
0) =
a0. Let y0 and φ0 denote the observed transfer y(x0, x
∗
0) and incremental surplus φ(x0, x
∗
0),
respectively. Then the knowledge of the triple (x0, x
∗
0, a0) allows us to recover γ = (y0 −
a0)/(φ0− a0). With γ and pi recovered, the incremental cost a is then identified from (8).
Another example is when the incremental cost is homogenous of degree one while the
incremental surplus has non-constant (diminishing or increasing) returns to scale. In this
case, consider any pair (x1, x
∗
1) and (x2, x
∗
2) ≡ (ρx1, ρx∗1) with a known constant ρ > 0.
Let yk, φk, ak be shorthands for the functions y, φ, a evaluated at (xk, x
∗
k) respectively,
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k = 1, 2. Because the incremental cost a(·, ·) is homogeneous of degree one, we have
a(x2, x
∗
2) = ρa(x1, x
∗
1) and
(y2 − γφ2)/(y1 − γφ1) = (1− γ)a2/[(1− γ)a1] = ρ,
which implies γ is identified as (y2 − ρy1)/(φ2 − ρφ1). (The non-constant returns to scale
in the incremental surplus φ(·, ·) ensures the denominator is non-zero.) Then a can be
recovered using (8) and knowledge of γ, φ as before.
The results in Theorem 1 can be readily extended to the incomplete contracts where
the procurer, rather than the contractor, covers the incremental costs up front. In such
a case, the transfer to the contractor is y = γs. The cost distribution of contractors can
be identified from (6) because the ex ante share of the negotiated net incremental surplus
δ¯(x;α∗) is identified. Using the relationship s = y/γ and (7), we can get an ordinary
differential equation of the surplus function that is similar to (9), with the solution being
a function of ϕ and y for a given γ. By combining this solution of pi with the restriction
in Assumption 2, we are able to identify γ. Then a is recovered from y = γs.
The identification results for our model are presented in an environment where the
number of bidders N is known to contractors as well as the procurer at the time of
the auctions. Athey and Haile (2007) argued (in their Section 6.3.3.) that in some
procurement settings the contractors may in fact know which of their competitors have
the capability to compete for a given contract or even which firms have been invited to
bid. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) maintained this assumption in their analysis
of the highway procurement auctions by Caltrans.
In other contexts, the actual number of auction participants N is not public infor-
mation to the parties involved in the auction. Nevertheless our identification strategy
remains valid in such cases as long as the variation in N is exogenous. (Athey and Haile
(2007) provides an example of how such exogenous variation arises in a model where bid-
ders’ entry decisions are related to costly signal acquisition.) With the actual distribution
of N being common knowledge among both parties, the existence of symmetric monotone
psPBE {α∗, β∗} follows from an argument similar to the proof in Appendix B. The only
necessary change is that the ex ante return for the contractors and the ex ante payment by
the procurer ϕ(x;α) now need to integrate out the number of bidders using the commonly
known distribution of N .
As for identification of the model when N is not known to the bidders, the results
in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are built on the monotonicity of the procurer’s strategy and
thus remain valid under any symmetric monotone psPBE in the model with bidders’
uncertainty about participation. Also, the result about recovering the inverse bidding
strategy in Lemma 3 holds when the contractors and the procurer are uncertain about the
participation, provided the data report the prices quoted by all contractors in an auction.
In this case, Athey and Haile (2007) showed the mark-up in the inverse bidding strategy
needs to incorporate the uncertainty about participation. This is done by integrating out
N using the actual distribution of the number of bidders, which is common knowledge
among all parties and is directly recoverable from the data (see the equations (6.23) and
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(6.24) in Athey and Haile (2007)).9 The identification of pi, a and γ then follows the same
argument as the proof of Theorem 1.
It remains an open question how to fully identify a richer model where decisions to
participate in auctions are selective in the sense that the entrants’ cost distribution differs
from the unconditional cost distribution in the population (this would happen if entry
is based on a preliminary signal that is correlated with private costs to be drawn in the
bidding stage). We leave this topic for future research.
4 Incomplete Contracts in Bilateral Negotiation
In practice, incomplete contracts also exist in bilateral negotiation between a procurer
and a single contractor. In this case, the sole contractor does not face any peer competition
in the pre-contract stage, and the initial payment from the procurer is also determined
via a direct negotiation between both parties. Such a situation could arise as a result of
some special matching process whereby the contract is highly customized to match the
procurer’s special need, or simply as a result of the contractor’s monopoly power on the
market. We show that the identification results from Section 3 can be extended to such
a bilateral-negotiation case.
In the first stage, the procurer observes a private signal X˜ ∈ X , and announces a
specification X ∈ X strategically to maximize his total ex ante return from the contract.
The contractor is notified of X and then negotiates with the procurer to set a first-stage
payment ψ(X) through a Nash bargaining process. The expected cost for delivering
the contract at the initial specification X is c(X). In the second stage, a feasible new
design X∗ is realized, leading to an incremental surplus φ(X,X∗) with an incremental
cost a(X,X∗). The new design will supplant the initial specification if it yields a positive
net incremental surplus s ≡ φ−a > 0. In this case, the contractor then re-negotiates with
the procurer via Nash Bargaining to set an additional transfer Y from the procurer. The
contractor pays incremental costs upfront; the surplus is accrued to the procurer. The
bargaining power is fixed and is common knowledge throughout the two stages: γ ∈ (0, 1)
for the contractor and 1 − γ for the procurer. The other elements pi, a, c and FX∗|X˜ are
also common knowledge for both parties.
With ψ(x) already determined in the first stage, the additional transfer from the
procurer to the contractor in the second stage is characterized by the solution to a Nash
Bargaining process
y(x, x∗) = arg max
t
[ψ(x) + t− c− a(x, x∗)− dc]γ [pi(x∗)− ψ(x)− t− dp]1−γ
where dc ≡ ψ(x)− c and dp ≡ pi(x)−ψ(x) are the disagreement values for the contractor
and the procurer, respectively, where c is the ex post cost for delivering the contract under
the initial specification x. The feasible new specification x∗ is realized in the second stage
9Futhermore, Song (2006) showed that identification of inverse bidding strategy in first-price procure-
ment auction with uncertain participation is also possible even if only the winning bid V and the second
lowest bid are reported in the data.
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and therefore is taken as an ingredient for the Nash Bargaining problem. It then follows
that the transfer is given by
y(x, x∗) = γφ(x, x∗) + (1− γ)a(x, x∗) (10)
for all x, x∗ when the new design is adopted (i.e. s(x, x∗) > 0); and the transfer is zero
otherwise. This takes the same form as in the model with pre-contractual competition in
auctions. We maintain that the negotiated price under an initial specification x in the
first stage is the solution to a Nash Bargaining problem with the feasible set given by the
ex ante surplus from the contract, and thus satisfies:
γ
{
pi(x)− c(x) + E[s+(x, x∗)|X˜ = x˜]
}
= ψ(x)− c(x) + γE[s+(x, x∗)|X˜ = x˜].
The expression between the braces on the left-hand side is the ex ante net surplus of the
contract; the right-hand side is the ex ante payoff for the contractor. This implies:
ψ(x) = γpi(x) + (1− γ)c(x). (11)
A procurer picks an initial specification to maximize its ex ante payoff:
α(x˜) = arg max
x∈X
{pi(x) + µ(x, x˜)− ψ(x)} , (12)
where µ(x, x˜) ≡ (1−γ)E[s+(x, x∗)|X˜ = x˜] as in the case with pre-contractual competition.
Assuming interior solution for all x˜, the first-order condition for (12) is
ψ′(z) = pi′(z) +
∂
∂x
[∫
t∈ω(x)
(1− γ)s(x, t)dFX∗|X˜=x˜(t)
]
x=z
for all z ∈ Xo ≡ {x : ∃x˜ ∈ X s.t. x = α∗(x˜)} where ω(x) is defined as in Section 3.
Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3, we can recover
γ, pi and a for all x ∈ Xo and x∗ ∈ ω(x) under Assumptions 1- 2. With ψ(x) directly
recoverable from the data, it then follows from (11) that the initial cost function c(x) is
also identified on Xo.
5 Empirical Application
In this section, we apply our model above to analyze the auctions of incomplete high-
way procurement contracts by Caltrans. Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014) (hereafter
BHT (2014)) used the same source of data to estimate the item-specific adaptation costs
due to the contract incompleteness, which were assumed to be proportional to each item
in the negotiated transfer from the procurer to the contractors. Our model differs funda-
mentally from BHT (2014) in several aspects.
First, we endogenize the procurer’s announcement of the initial specification. BHT
(2014) considered the procurer’s initial specification (engineers’ estimates) as exogenously
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given, and focused on strategic interaction between contractors in first-price procurement
auctions where bidders’ interim payoffs are adjusted due to contractual incompleteness.
In contrast, we consider a strategic environment where the procurer chooses the initial
specification optimally based on its information. The contractors quote prices to maximize
their expected return in response to the procurer’s choice. Both sides take the contractual
incompleteness into account while making strategic decisions.
Second, we maintain a flexible information structure. BHT (2014) assumed all con-
tractors have perfect foresight about the final specification and the subsequent negotiated
transfer.10 The equilibrium concept in their structural analysis is the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE), where contractors maximize interim payoffs based on the common
knowledge of uncertainty in private costs. In comparison, we maintain that (a) the pro-
curer, as the first-mover in a dynamic game, picks an optimal initial specification based
on a noisy signal about the new design and (b) the contractors, once notified of this initial
specification, update their beliefs about the new specification in a way that is consistent
with the procurer’s strategy. The appropriate equilibrium concept in such a dynamic
context and information structure is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). As a re-
sult, the identification and estimation of the structural elements in our model require an
original constructive argument.
Last but not the least, we explicitly model a Nash Bargaining process that determines
the negotiated transfer between the procurer and the winning contractor if the new spec-
ification is adopted. Specifically, the transfer is negotiated so that each party eventually
receives a share of the net incremental surplus that is proportional to its bargaining power.
In addition to the distribution of contractors’ private costs, we estimate the procurer’s
bargaining power as well as the net social surplus and cost functions which depend on the
initial as well as the final specification.
5.1 Data
The data includes 5, 862 bids submitted by contractors in 1, 293 procurement auctions
by Caltrans between 1995 and 2000. We index the contracts by j = 1, 2, · · · , J and the
contractors by i = 1, 2, · · · , nj. Over 90% of the contracts in the data receive prices quote
from 2 to 7 contractors in the procurement auctions. For each contract, the data report the
initial specification (a.k.a. the engineers’ estimate) x, the actual specification adopted x∗
(calculated using the Blue Book prices published in the Contract Cost Data Book (CCDB)
and the actual quantities of items used for the project), and the post-contractual transfer
y (negotiated after the auction) from the procurer to the winning contractor.11 It records
zero transfer for some minority cases where no new specification is adopted after the
auction. The data also reports the bids submitted by all participating contractors in each
auction as well as several cost-related characteristics for the contractors. These include
10See, for example, the second paragraph in Section II.A and equation (1) in Section II.B in BHT
(2014).
11Following BHT (2014), we calculate the total post-contractual transfer by adding up transfers under
three categories in the data: “adjustment”, “deduction” and “extra work”.
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the distance between the contractor’s location and the work site for the project (dis), a
dummy variable that equals one if the contractor is a “fringe” competitor (fri), and the
contractor’s utilization rate defined as the ratio of its backlog and capacity (uti).12
In addition, we classify the contracts into two types based on the nature of the work
according to the project description. Type one contracts (job = 1) involve major con-
struction or rebuilding (e.g., replace bridge or widen highway, etc.). Type zero contracts
(job = 0) only require relatively minor or decorative tasks (e.g., realign curves, install
traffic signals or other accessories, etc.). The data report little correlation between the
engineers’ estimates and the job type we define (with correlation coefficient < 0.01), and
thus it is unlikely that the latter is just a classification of the former.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our data. The average post-contractual
transfer due to incompleteness is about $172,000 per contract, which is about 1/10 of
the actual size of the project. Among all the contracts, 94.04% (or 1216 cases) reported
non-zero transfers negotiated after the auction while 5.96% (or 77 cases) report zero
transfer, suggesting the contracts are complete. Type one (major construction) jobs
account for 38.0% of all contracts with an average transfer of $203,478; type zero (minor
project) jobs have an average transfer of $152,979. For each auction, we report the average
characteristics such as fringe, utilization, and distance for all participating contractors
(labeled as afri, auti and adis below). We model such average characteristics as a
measure of the factors that potentially affect the procurer’s bargaining power against the
contractors. For each contractor in an auction, we also record the minimum distance to
the job site (rdis) and the minimum utilization rate among its competitors (ruti). As
in BHT (2014), we model a contractor’s bidding strategy as a function of these contract-
and contractor-level variables which are common knowledge among the contractors.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy takes two steps. We first estimate the surplus (pi), the in-
cremental costs (a) and the bargaining power parameters using the variation in observed
transfers and contract characteristics in the data. To do so, we introduce a two-stage
extremum estimator. The idea is to construct an objective function that consists of two
components that are minimized at the true parameter values. The first is based on the
conditional likelihood of observed transfers, and the second on the first-order condition
characterizing the procurer’s optimal choice of initial specification. Next, we estimate the
cost distribution of contractors using prices quoted by contractors. To do so, we need to
use the estimates from the first step to disentangle the original cost distribution based
on initial specification and the contractors’ ex ante adjustment in their return due to the
contractual incompleteness.
12A fringe competitor is defined as a firm that has won less than 1 percent of the value of contracts
awarded in the data.
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In Section 3, we present the identification argument for the simple case with homoge-
nous contracts and no structural observational errors. In comparison, we consider in
the current section a general environment that allows rich heterogeneity among the con-
tract and contractors. In order to make estimation feasible, we now adopt a parametric
specification of model primitives.
5.2.1 Surplus, incremental costs and bargaining power
To simplify exposition, we drop the indices of contract j and contractor i in the no-
tation. Intuitively, contractors’ bargaining power should depend on features such as the
nature of the task, the intensity of competition among interested bidders and contractor
characteristics. Therefore we specify the bargaining power of the contractor in a negoti-
ation as
γ(w;λ) = exp(w′λ)/[1 + exp(w′λ)]
with w ≡ [afri, auti, adis, nbid, job] and nbid being the number of contractors who submit
bids. The vector w essentially consists of contract-level variables that are known to the
procurer and the bidders at the time of their decisions respectively. Such a specification
is also motivated by the fact that the bargaining power as perceived by the procurer and
contractors in the auction does not depend on ex post individual-specific characteristics
of the winner, whose identity is not known before the auction is concluded.
We also introduce some structural errors in the model explained in Section 3 to al-
low flexibility of the outcome conditional on the explanatory variables. Specifically, the
negotiated transfer y is modeled as
y = d [γφ+ (1− γ)a+ ε] (13)
where
d = 1{φ− a+ η > 0} (14)
is the dummy for whether the contract is incomplete with a positive transfer from the post-
auction negotiation. For now we suppress all arguments in γ, φ, a above to simplify the
notation. To understand the selection equation in (14), recall that 5.9% of the contracts
are not incomplete (i.e. do not involve any post-auction transfer) and that our model
states the incompleteness takes place only when the net incremental surplus is positive.
The structural errors (ε, η) are bi-variate zero-mean normal with a standard deviation
(1, σ) and a correlation coefficient ρ. The structural errors account for measurement
errors, or idiosyncratic factors that affect the transfer or contract incompleteness but are
orthogonal to the initial and new specification (e.g., additional compensation for delay in
payment due to bureaucracy).
Let θ denote the vector of parameters in the surplus pi and incremental cost a. We
specify the surplus pi as
pi(x, job; θ) ≡ θ0 + θ1x+ θ2(x× job) + θ3x2. (15)
Thus the incremental surplus is φ(x, x∗, job; θ) ≡ pi(x∗, job; θ)− pi(x, job; θ). This specifi-
cation captures the fact that the social surplus depends on the job type and specification,
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but not the characteristics of the contractor to whom the contract is awarded. The loca-
tion parameter θ0 is identifiable with a boundary condition on pi. The incremental costs
are given by:
a(x, x∗, job; θ) ≡ θ4(x∗ − x) + θ5(x∗ − x)× job+ θ6(x∗ − x)2. (16)
We do not include contractor characteristics in the specification of the incremental costs
a. This is because the size of specification changes is mostly small relative to the initial
specification. Therefore, a contractor’s characteristics have a much more pronounced
impact on the costs conditional on initial specification FC|X than on the incremental costs.
Thus the specification in (16) offers a reasonable approximation of incremental costs that
can be identified. The specifications in (15) and (16) satisfy the identifying condition in
Assumption 2. We show in Appendix D that the parametric model is identified.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In order to see how post-auction transfers are related to the contract specification
and characteristics and to motivate our specification above, we report the results from
several linear regressions of the observed transfer on X, X∗ and w in Table 2. In all
specifications, the type of work (job) has a significant positive effect on the observed
transfer, and the effect becomes less pronounced as the size of the new specification X∗
increases. The number of bidders, the proportion of fringe bidders in an auction, and the
average utilization rate of participants (nbid, afri, auti) all affect the transfer through
their interaction with the initial and the new specification. The location of the work site
also seems to have significant positive impact on the negotiated transfer. These patterns
are consistent with our specification of the bargaining power as well as the surplus and
incremental costs.
We estimate (θ, λ, ρ, σ) via two stages. In the first stage, we apply the probit algo-
rithm to estimate a subvector of θ from (16). That is, the probit procedure using the
explanatory variables [x∗ − x, (x∗ − x) × job, x∗2 − x2, (x∗ − x)2] returns estimates for
(θˆ1− θˆ4, θˆ2− θˆ5, θˆ3, θˆ6) ≡ θˆ−1,2. (See Appendix D for details.) To simplify notation, denote
the remaining parameters by τ ≡ (θ1, θ2, λ, ρ, σ).
In the second stage, we construct an extremum estimator for τ , using an objective
function that consists of two components LJ and MJ . The first component LJ is the
log-likelihood for the truncated distribution of negotiated transfer:
LJ(τ) ≡ J−1
∑
j
lˆj(τ) where
lˆj(τ) = log Φ
(
Iˆs,j+
ρ
σ (yj−Iˆo,j)√
1−ρ2
)
+ log φnorm
(
yj − Iˆo,j
σ
)
− log σ − log Φ(Iˆs,j)
where j indexes contracts, Φ and φnorm are standard normal CDF and pdf, and
Io,j ≡ γjφˆj + (1− γj)aˆj and Is,j ≡ φˆj − aˆj.
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with γj ≡ γ(wj;λ), φˆj ≡ φnorm(xj, x∗j , wj; τ, θˆ−1,2) and aˆj ≡ a(xj, x∗j , wj; τ, θˆ−1,2).
The second component in the objective function MJ is based on a set of moments
derived from the first-order condition in the procurer’s maximization problem in equilib-
rium. The condition, summarized in (7), requires that the marginal impact of the initial
specification on the expected price of auction to be equal to its marginal impact on the
initial surplus pi and the ex ante share of net incremental surplus µ. We constructMJ as
a sample analog for
E
{
[ϕ1(x,w)− pi1(x, job; τ)− µ1(x, x˜, job; τ)]2
}
, (17)
where ϕ1, pi1 and µ1 respectively are derivatives of ϕ(x,w), pi(x, job) and µ(x, x˜, job),
which is defined as E[(1 − γ(w;λ))s+(x,X∗) | X˜ = x˜] where the expectation is with
respect to the new specification conditional on the signal x˜. The procurer’s ex ante
payment ϕ(x,w) depends on the contract heterogeneity reported in the data, and is
directly identifiable. By a standard argument for parametric identification in nonlinear
least squares, we know that the true parameter τ uniquely minimizes (17) as long as for
any τ ′ 6= τ , pi1(x, job; τ)+µ1(x, x˜, job; τ) 6= pi1(x, job; τ ′)+µ1(x, x˜, job; τ ′) at least for some
x˜, job and x = α∗(x˜).
Specifically, we construct the second component in the objective function as
MJ ≡ J−1
∑
j
ξˆj(τ)
where
ξˆj(τ) ≡ [ϕˆ1(xj, wj)− pi1(xj, jobj; τ)− µˆ1(xj, x˜j, jobj; τ)]2
and x˜j ≡ r if xj is the 100*r-th percentile of the empirical distribution of the initial spec-
ification (recall that we normalize the marginal distribution of x˜ to a standard uniform).
To calculate ξˆj, we first estimate the regression model
ϕ(x,w;κ) ≡ E[y | x,w] = w˜′κ (18)
where w˜ ≡ [1, x, x2, afri, auti, adis, nbid, job, x × afri, x × auti, x × adis, x × nbid,
x × job]. This is the ex ante payment by the procurer and thus does not depend on the
new specification x∗ which is not known at the time of the auctions. Then we estimate ϕ1
by plugging in the OLS estimates from the regression in (18), and denote the estimate
by ϕˆ1.
13 To calculate µˆ1, we exploit the independence between w and (x
∗, ε) given job as
well as the fact that
µ1(x, x˜, job; τ) = E[(1− γ(w;λ) | job]× E
[
Φ(s(X∗, x, job))
∂s(X∗, x, job)
∂x
∣∣∣∣ x˜, job] (19)
13That is, ϕˆ1(x,w) is calculated as
κˆ1 + 2κˆ2x+ κˆ8afri+ κˆ9auti+ κˆ10adis+ κˆ11nbid+ κˆ12job
where κˆ1, κˆ2, κˆ8, κˆ9, κˆ10, κˆ11, κˆ12 are regression estimates for the coefficients in front of x, x
2 and the last
five product terms of w˜ in (18).
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under our parametric specification. The second conditional expectation on the r.h.s. of
(19) is taken with respect to the new specification X∗ conditional on the procurer’s noisy
signal X˜. For each τ , we calculate µˆ1(xj, x˜j, jobj; τ) by plugging in the first-stage estimates
θˆ−1,2 in the expression for s and ∂s/∂x, taking the conditional sample average to estimate
the first expectation, and evaluating the second expectation using simulated observations
of x∗ that are drawn from the estimated distribution of X∗ given X˜ = x˜j.14 Finally, our
estimator τˆ in the second stage is:
τˆ = max
τ
{LJ(τ)−MJ(τ)} . (20)
The true parameters θ1,2 and τ are identified in this two-stage approach of estimation.
First off, θ−1,2 is identified in the probit procedure in the first-stage by standard arguments.
Next, as we show in Appendix D, under the parametrization we use, the true τ is a unique
maximizer of the population counterpart for LJ (that is, the uniform probability limit of
LJ over the parameter space given consistent first-stage estimator). Also, the equilibrium
first-order condition also implies that τ is the unique minimizer of the uniform probability
limit of MJ under the mild parametric condition mentioned above. Hence τ is identified
as the unique maximizer of the uniform probability limit of LJ −MJ .
Because the estimand in (20) is a smooth function of the sample analogs, the two-
stage extremum estimator is asymptotically normal under usual regularity conditions. (If
we were to following the asymptotic plug-in approach for inference, then the asymptotic
variance of τˆ needs to include a term that accounts for the first-stage estimation error
from the probit procedure.) In practice, we use the bootstrap procedure to estimate the
standard error of our estimator. To implement the maximization routine in the second
stage, we pick an initial value for τ by estimating a two-stage MLE that maximizes LJ
alone (which produces a consistent estimator for τ).
5.2.2 Distribution of contractors’ private costs
Recall that δ¯(X;α∗) = E[γs+(X,X∗)|X = x;α∗] and y − a = γs whenever s > 0. Let
q(x, job) denote the probability that the contract is incomplete with observed transfer
(d = 1) conditional on the information available to the contractors while bidding in the
auction (that is, engineers’ estimates and the job type). It then follows from Lemma 3
that for a contractor i in auction j,
cj,i = pj,i − 1
nj − 1
1− FP |Z(pj,i | zj,i)
fP |Z(pj,i | zj,i) + E [Y − a(xj, X
∗, jobj) | xj, zj,i, dj = 1] q(xj, jobj),
(21)
14Recall that we normalize the marginal distribution of X˜ to a standard uniform, which is without loss
of generality due to Lemma 2. Also monotone strategy in equilibrium implies that FX∗|X˜=α∗−1(x) equals
FX∗|X=x. The empirical density of X∗ given X in auctions with an observed transfer is approximated well
by a normal distribution. Thus we specify the relationship between X∗ and X as (X∗−X)/X ∼ N (ν, σ˜2)
for incomplete auctions with observed transfers, and then use a maximum likelihood formula to estimate
ν, σ˜. The second expectation is then calculated for each τ using simulated draws of x∗ based on these
estimates.
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where zj,i ≡ [frij,i, utij,i, disj,i, jobj, rutij,i, rdisj,i] and rutij,i, rdisj,i are contractor-level
variables recording the minimum distance and utilization rate among the competitors
that a contractor i faces, respectively. The expectation of y − a conditions only on xj
and zj,i because the contractor’s ex ante share of the net incremental surplus depends on
contractor characteristics revealed prior to the auction.
For simplicity, we suppress the auction index j in (cj,i, pj,i, zj,i) and (nj, xj) and only
keep the contractor index i when there is no ambiguity. We adopt a logit specification for
the probability for contractual incompleteness q:
q(x, job;ϑ) = exp(v′ϑ)/[1 + exp(v′ϑ)] (22)
where v ≡ [1, x, job, x× job, x2]. Denote the maximum likelihood estimator by ϑˆ.15
Following the specification in BHT (2014), we estimate bidders’ bidding strategies
(normalized by the initial specification or engineers’ estimates) via the following regres-
sion:
pi
x
= f(zi;ω) + u+ ei, (23)
where u is a contract-specific fixed-effect that accounts for unobserved contract charac-
teristics, f is specified to be linear in the parameter ω and the idiosyncratic error ei is
independent from z and u. As BHT (2014) mentioned, the specification allows for het-
erogeneity in the structural error via the contract size in x. Recall that, in our model,
neither the contractors or the procurer know or have perfect foresight of the negotiated
transfer (unknown and stochastic ex ante). Thus, the bidding strategy can not depend
on any ex post observation of these transfers.16
For each contract indexed by j, we estimate the coefficient ωˆ and the fixed effect uˆ using
a standard fixed-effect approach conditional on the number of bidders. These estimates
are then used to calculate the residual eˆi. The distribution of ei depends on the number
of contractors bidding for a contract, but is orthogonal to z and u. By construction, for
each number of bidders, FP |Z equals:
FP |Z(pi | zi) = Pr(f(zi;ω) + u+ ei ≤ pi/x) = Fe(pi/x− f(zi;ω)− u),
where Fe(·) is the CDF of the ei (we suppress the dependence of FP |Z and Fe on n to
simplify notation). The corresponding conditional density of bids is
fP |Z(pi | zi) ≡ ∂∂pFe(pi/x− f(zi;ω)− u) = fe(pi/x− f(zi;ω)− u)/x.
We estimate FP |Z and fP |Z by plugging in the estimates uˆ, ωˆ, and the empirical distribu-
tion and kernel density of eˆi to the right-hand sides above. Let FˆP |Z and fˆP |Z denote the
estimates of FP |Z and fP |Z , respectively.
15Alternatively, we can also estimate q(x, job) nonparametrically via kernel regression.
16Note that the inverse bidding strategy for contractors is recovered nonparametrically due to (21).
Hence in principle the reduced-form linear specification in (23) is not necessary for estimating bidding
strategies in large samples. We implement this reduced-form regression to estimate bidding strategies
mostly due to data constraints.
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Using the specification (21), the cost for bidder i in contract j is estimated as:
cˆj,i = pj,i − 1
nj − 1
1− FˆP |Z(pj,i | zj,i)
fˆP |Z(pj,i | zj,i)
+ δˆj,iqˆj,
where qˆj ≡ q(xj, jobj; ϑˆ) and
δˆj,i ≡ Ê[Yj | xj, zj,i, dj = 1]− S−1
∑S
s=1
a(xj, x
∗
j,s, jobj; θˆ).
The first term in δˆj,i is estimated using nonparametric kernel regression; the second term
in δˆj,i is a simulation-based estimate for the expectation of the incremental costs a con-
ditional on contractual incompleteness, initial specification and contract characteristics.
Specifically, x∗j,s are independent draws from the estimated density of x
∗ given xj and
dj = 1 (which is estimated in the previous step).
We use a bootstrap procedure to calculate the standard error of parameters in the
surplus and incremental cost functions and the average marginal effect of contract char-
acteristics on the contractor’s bargaining power.
5.3 Results
Table 3 reports the regression estimates for the expected payment in (18) under three
nested specifications. In all specifications, the initial specification (engineers’ estimate)
has a significant positive marginal effect on the expected auction price (the lowest price
quoted by contractors in an auction). This suggests the engineers’ estimate on average is a
reasonable predictive factor for the auction price. That the marginal effect is statistically
greater than one is due to the mark-ups added by the contractors in their quotes. There is
also evidence in the third specification that this effect diminishes for contracts with larger
initial specifications. On average, a higher utilization rate among the contractors tends
to lower the auction price. This may indicate that there is an economy of scale in the
construction costs for contractors working on multiple contracts simultaneously. The job
type, the number of bidders and the other average contractor characteristics all have a
statistically significant impact on the auction prices, especially via their positive impacts
on the marginal effect of engineers’ estimates.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 reports the estimates for the average marginal effects of contract and contrac-
tor characteristics on the bargaining power. The number of bidders (nbid), the average
utilization rate among bidders (auti), the proportion of fringe firms (afri) and the type
of job (job) all have significant bearings on the bargaining power. For example, consider
the third specification. On average, the bargaining power for a winning contractor is
10.2% higher if the winner had to defeat an additional competing contractor in the auc-
tion. This indicates that the intensity of the pre-contractual competition in the auction
24
is positively related to the winner’s subsequent bargaining power against the procurer
in post-contractual negotiation. This may be because the strength of a contractor (e.g.,
cost or logistic efficiency), which enables it to defeat other competitors in an auction, also
gives it more leverage in the negotiation with the procurer.
The average utilization rate and the proportion of fringe contractors are both impor-
tant in explaining the bargaining power. Our estimates show that if the average utilization
rate in an auction is increased by 10%, then the bargaining power of the contractor in-
creases by 1.86%. This conforms with the intuition that a contractor has more leverage
over the procurer when its competitors are on average more occupied or committed to
other projects. Our estimate also suggests that, in an auction where all contractors are
major competitors (non-fringe firms) in the industry (afri = 0), the bargaining power
for the winner of the auction in post-contractual negotiation is 29.6% higher than in an
auction that only receives quotes from fringe contractors (afri = 1). This result reveals
that a contractor who defeats major competitors has a greater bargaining power than one
who wins the competition with fringe competitors.
[Insert Table 4 here]
There are two important observations regarding the relation between the job type and
the post-contractual negotiation. First, the contractor has a greater bargaining power
than the procurer in subsequent negotiations. Our estimates show the contractor’s mean
bargaining power is significantly greater than 50% regardless of job types. One explanation
for this is that the procurer is more subject to the possible high costs to extend project
deadlines and to solicit quotes from other contractors if the negotiation breaks down.
Second, other things being equal, the procurer’s bargaining power is 11.7% greater in
contracts that require substantial work (job = 1) than in those involving less onerous
tasks. These patterns persist in all three specifications presented in Table 4. This could
be ascribed to the possibility that procurers (municipal government departments) are more
likely to play hardball in post-auction negotiations if the contract involves a major project
and more tax-payer’s money and larger social surplus at stake. Another interpretation is
that the winners in major projects are top firms in the industry who participate in and
win the contracts more often than the smaller firms. Thus, they have the incentive to
maintain a good and long-term relationship with the procurer by making concessions to
the procurer in negotiation.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Table 5 reports the estimates of the social surplus and the incremental cost func-
tions. The estimates suggest that the social surplus function is convex in the size of the
specification. This is consistent with the fact that highway construction / renovation is
essentially public service and a larger project generally benefits a greater population, thus
resulting in increasing returns to scale in the surplus it induces. Our estimates for the
incremental costs conform with the following pattern in the data: Larger transfers are
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often reported in projects that involve more substantial post-contractual modification in
the specification.
We test the null hypothesis that the incremental surplus s is linear in the post-
contractual change (X∗ − X) (that is, the coefficients for x2 in pi and for (x∗ − x)2 in
a). The result rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level with a p-value of
2.3% in the third (the most general) specification. In addition, we use a Wald statistic to
test the joint significance of x and x∗ in s. This yields a p-value of 0.2%. These results
validate our specification that the incremental cost and surplus depend on the initial and
the final specifications as well as the job type.
To quantify the job type’s effect on the post-contractual transfer, we plug in the
structural estimates above to calculate the average difference between the truncated mean
of the transfer (expectation of transfer given that the contract is incomplete with new
specification adopted) conditional on job = 1 (major projects) and conditional on job = 0
respectively. This provides us with estimates for the ex ante marginal effect of the job type
on the truncated means, with other contract characteristics in w, the initial specification
x and the final specification x∗ integrated out in the expectation. For the most general
specification, the estimated difference is 0.052 with a standard error (calculated using a
bootstrap procedure) of 0.020. The tests under the other two nested specifications also
report statistical significance of job at the 5% level. Our estimates from Table 4 and 5
also indicate that the type of job affects the negotiated transfer mainly through its effect
on the bargaining power.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Table 6 reports estimates in the logit model for contract incompleteness (22), which
are used for estimating the cost distribution of contractors. By definition q(x, job;ϑ) is
the probability of contractual incompleteness in equilibrium in the data. Our estimates
in Table 6 illustrate that the engineers’ estimate is a main determinant for the probability
of contractual incompleteness whereas the job types do not play an important role in
this regard. This empirical evidence is in the line with the observation in Tirole (2009)
that the hold-up problem occurs under the incomplete contracts where the probability of
incompleteness is determined by the endogenous choice of the procurer.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Table 7 reports the estimates of the markup as a percentage of contractors’ costs. That
is, it reports the ratio of markups defined as (pj,i + δˆj,iqˆj − cˆj,i)/cˆj,i. The estimates for
contractors’ ex ante payoff consists of the initial payment pj,i from the procurer following
the auction and a negotiated share of the expected net incremental surplus (δˆj,iqˆj). The
markup ratio is estimated by $ˆj,i/cˆj,i where $ˆj,i ≡ [1−F̂P |Z(pj,i|zj,i)]/[(nj−1)f̂P |Z(pj,i|zj,i)]
for contractor i in auction j. On average, a contractor obtains 9% markup in a highway
construction project. The table demonstrates that contractors’ markups are affected by
both their characteristics and the contract-level heterogeneity.
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We observe that the markups in contracts involving substantial work (job = 1) are
lower than those involving relatively minor ones. This may be due to our finding that
the contractors’ bargaining power on major projects are smaller, and hence they obtain
a smaller share of the incremental surplus from negotiation. To investigate the impact of
competition on contractors’ markups, we classify the number of bidders in four groups:
2, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8}, and {> 8}. Within each group, the markups for different number of
bidders are very close. Our estimates reveal a clear pattern on the decreasing markups
in the number of competitors. In particular, when there are only two competitors, the
winning contractor benefits from substantially higher markups than in auctions with more
competitors. This also offers some evidence supporting the assumption that contractors
are aware of the number of competitors in an auction. On average, the auctions in the
data have five bidders, which suggests a moderate level of competition. For auctions with
five contractors, the average markup is 9.94%.
The winning contractors appear to enjoy much higher markups than those who lose
in auctions. An explanation for this pattern is that the cost for a winner is usually much
lower than competitors. Hence the winner could quote a competitive price even with a
high markup. Besides, our estimates show that the markup of a non-fringe firm is slightly
higher than that from a fringe firm at the 25-th, median and 75-th quantiles.
Another factor that affects contractors’ markups is the utilization rate. In our data,
about 50% of the contractors have a zero utilization rate (that is, they are not committed
to other ongoing projects simultaneously). These contractors’ markups on average are
higher than those with positive utilization rates. Nonetheless the impact does not seem
to be substantial, especially because the estimates do not suggest any significant relation
between the markups and the level of positive utilization rates. The estimated markups
for contractors with different distances from the job sites also do not appear to vary
substantially.
Notice that our estimates of markups rely on the contractors’ negotiated share of
the net incremental surplus. Without taking into account the contractors’ additional
revenue due to the incompleteness of a contract, we would estimate the markups as
$ˆj,i/ (pj,i − $ˆj,i), which is strictly greater than $ˆj,i/cˆj,i because the estimates for ex ante
net incremental surplus are positive. This means if we were to estimate the markups
in these procurement auctions without accounting for the strategic incentives due to
contractual incompleteness, we would end up over-estimating these markups substantially.
To further illustrate this point, we estimate the markups by assuming away the negotiated
share of incremental surplus and the results are presented in Table 8. The estimates
demonstrate that the average markups can be over-estimated to be two times as high as
the correct estimates (17.60% v.s. 9.03%). The effects of contractors’ characteristics and
the project-level heterogeneity on markups are all exaggerated.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies incomplete contracts in procurement auctions. We set up a model
that endogenizes a procurer’s choice of initial specification. The model also rationalizes
27
the post-auction transfers as Nash Bargaining outcomes from the negotiation between
the procurer and the auction winner, and maintains a flexible assumption on the infor-
mation structure. We show that the model components (the incremental cost and surplus
functions, the bargaining power for contractors and the cost distribution for contrac-
tors) are non-parametrically identified from the contract prices and negotiated transfers.
The identification results are also extended to bilateral incomplete contracts without pre-
contractual competition. We apply the model to analyze the data on the Caltrans auctions
of highway procurement contracts. Our estimates provide new evidence as to how agents
respond strategically to the presence of contractual incompleteness, and what determines
the size of the hold-up in highway procurement projects.
One of the goals of this paper is to provide the literature with a new methodology
to empirically study the vast field data of incomplete contracts. It will be interesting to
explore whether the methods used here can be useful for evaluating the impact of incom-
pleteness on the efficiency of mechanisms, e.g., whether revenue equivalence still holds
once incompleteness occurs. The exposition of our method is in the context of procure-
ment auctions but it might be extended to other formats of pre-contractual competition,
e.g., English auctions. We are considering these possibilities in future work.
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Appendix
A The Nash Bargaining Solution
This part of the appendix characterizes the Nash Bargaining solution in the post-
auction negotiation. Let v denote the auction price and c denote the auction winner’s ex
post cost for delivering the contract under the initial specification x. The disagreement
value (a.k.a. reservation value) for the auction winner (the contractor quoting the lowest
price) is
dc ≡ v − c
while the disagreement value for the procurer is
dp ≡ pi − v
with pi being the social surplus under the initial specification x. With a realized new
feasible design x∗, the ex post total net social surplus to be shared among the procurer
and the auction winner is
u0 ≡ pi∗ − a− c
where pi∗ is the social surplus under x∗ and a is the incremental costs for delivering
the contract under x∗ (in addition to the costs c for delivering the contract under x).
With γ denoting the bargaining power of the contractor, the Nash Bargaining solution is
characterized by
max (uc − dc)γ (up − dp)1−γ
subject to up + uc ≤ u0. By a standard argument,
uc ≡ γ(u0 − dp) + (1− γ)dc = γs+ v − c
and
up ≡ u0 − uc = (1− γ)s+ pi − v
with s ≡ pi∗ − pi − a defined as the net incremental surplus.
As stated in the text, we maintain that the contractor covers the incremental costs a
as they arise in construction while the incremental surplus pi∗ − pi is eventually accrued
to the procurer. Then the negotiated transfer y needs to satisfy:
dc + y − a = uc and dp + pi∗ − pi − y = up
which is equivalent to
y − a = γs and pi∗ − pi − y = (1− γ)s.
This proves that the post-auction negotiated transfer characterized in Section 2.
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B Existence and Uniqueness of PsPBE
Let G(· | x;α) denote the C.D.F. of adjusted costs C˜i ≡ Ci − δ¯(x;α) conditional on
X = x and a procurer strategy α. That is,
G(t | x;α) ≡ Pr(Ci − δ¯(x;α) ≤ t | X = x)
= Pr(Ci ≤ t+ δ¯(x;α) | X = x).
For any given α, the standard arguments such as that in Krishna (2009) show that a
symmetric monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in such procurement
auctions where contractors’ private costs are drawn from G(· | X;α). Let G˜ ≡ 1 − G
denote a survival function, so that G˜(c | x;α)N−1 ≡ Pr{minj 6=iCj ≥ c | x;α} and
1− G˜(c | x;α)N−1 ≡ Pr{minj 6=iCj ≤ c | x;α}. For all i = 1, 2, · · · , N and any c ∈ C and
x ∈ X ,
βi(c, x;α) =
∫ c¯
c
sd[1− G˜(s | x;α)N−1]
G˜(c | x;α)N−1 ,
where c¯ denotes the upper bound of C and it can also be infinity.
We prove the existence of pure-strategy PBE through two steps. First, we express the
solution to a procurer’s optimization problem as the solution to an ordinary differential
equation (ODE). Then, we show a solution to this ODE exists.
First, recall that a procurer’s optimization problem is
α(x˜) = arg max
x∈X
{pi(x) + µ(x, x˜)− ϕ(x;α)} ,
where ϕ(x;α) is a shorthand of the procurer’s expected payment ψ(x; βα). By definition,
ϕ(x;α) = N
∫ c¯
0
βi(c, x;α) Pr
(
min
j 6=i
Cj ≥ c
)
dG(c | x;α)
= N
∫ c¯
0
sd
[
1− G˜(s | x;α)N−1
]
−N
∫ c¯
0
sG˜(s | x;α)d
[
1− G˜(s | x;α)N−1
]
where the first term is NE
[
minj 6=i C˜j
∣∣∣X = x]; and the second term is
N
∫ c¯
0
sG˜(s | x;α)(N − 1)G˜(s | x;α)N−2g(s | x;α)ds
= (N − 1)
∫ c¯
0
sd
[
1− G˜N(s | x;α)
]
= (N − 1)E
[
min
i
C˜i
∣∣∣X = x] .
Hence we can write
ϕ(x;α) = NE
[
min
j 6=i
C˜j
∣∣∣∣X = x]− (N − 1)E [mini C˜i∣∣∣X = x] .
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By construction, E[mini C˜i | X = x] = E [miniCi | X = x]− δ¯(x;α) and similarly we have
that E
[
minj 6=i C˜j
∣∣∣X = x] = E [minj 6=iCi | X = x]− δ¯(x;α). Therefore
ϕ(x;α) = σ(x)− δ¯(x;α)
with σ(x) ≡ NE[C(1:N−1)|X = x] − (N − 1)E[C(1:N)|X = x]; and C(m:n) being the m-
th smallest out of n independent draws from FC|X . It then follows that a symmetric
monotone psPBE of our model exists if the fixed-point mapping
α(x˜) = arg max
x∈X
[
pi(x) + µ(x, x˜) + δ¯(x;α)− σ(x)] (B.1)
admits a monotone solution α∗.
Let δ(x, x˜) ≡ E[γs+(x,X∗) | X˜ = x˜], where the expectation is taken with respect
to X∗ according to FX∗|X˜ with the initial specification X fixed at x. By construction
δ¯(x;α) = δ(x, α−1(x)) for any increasing procurer strategy α. The functions pi, µ, σ, δ are
all determined by model primitives and do not involve any endogenous equilibrium object.
Suppose pi, µ, σ, δ are all differentiable; and interior solutions to (B.1) exist for all x˜ ∈ X .
Then for any α that solves (B.1):
∂[pi(X) + µ(X, X˜) + δ¯(X;α)− σ(X)]
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=α(x˜),X˜=x˜
= pi′(α(x˜)) + µ1(α(x˜), x˜)− σ′(α(x˜)) + δ1(α(x˜), x˜) + δ2(α(x˜), x˜) 1
α′(x˜)
= 0,∀x˜ ∈ X ,
where µl and δl denote partial derivatives of µ and δ w.r.t. their l-th arguments respec-
tively. In what follows, we focus on showing that the first-order ordinary differential
equation below admits a monotone solution:
α′(x˜) =
δ2(α(x˜), x˜)
σ′(α(x˜))− [pi′(α(x˜)) + µ1(α(x˜), x˜) + δ1(α(x˜), x˜)] ≡ λ (x˜, α(x˜)) . (B.2)
To show the existence of a unique symmetric monotone psPBE, we need to show the
differential equation (B.2) has a unique monotone solution. We present the regularity
conditions below and then a lemma for existence. Let D ≡ X × X be a rectangle on
which λ(x˜, x) is defined.
Assumption B.1. (Global Lipschitz Condition) ∃M > 0 such that for all (x˜, x) and
(x˜, x′) in D, |λ(x˜, x)− λ(x˜, x′)| ≤M |x− x′| .
Assumption B.2. (Initial Point) There exists (x˜0, x0) in the interior of D such that
α(x˜0) = x0.
Assumption B.3. (Monotonicity) For any pair x1 > x2 in X , the conditional distribution
of cost FC|X=x1 first order stochastically dominates FC|X=x2 . The function δ(x, x˜) is
increasing in x˜; and pi(x)− E
[
s+(x,X
∗) | X˜ = x˜
]
is non-increasing in x for each x˜.
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Lemma B.1 Under Assumptions B.1-B.3 there exists a unique and monotone solution
α∗ to (B.2).
Proof of lemma B.1. The existence and uniqueness of a solution on X to the differential
equation (B.2) is a variant of Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem, which states a result of existence
and uniqueness of local solutions for a given initial condition if λ(x˜, x) is continuous in
x˜ and locally Lipschitz continuous in x. The global Lipschitz continuity of λ(x˜, x) in
Assumption B.1 strengthens Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem and guarantees a unique solution
globally defined on X for a given initial condition in Assumption B.2. The detailed
discussion on the results above can be found in, e.g., Theorem 10 of Chapter 1 in Adkins
and Davidson (2012).
To show the monotonicity of the solution α∗, it suffices to prove that λ(x, x˜) > 0 on
D, which can be described using model primitives as:
λ(x, x˜) =
∂E
[
γs+(x,X
∗)|X˜ = x˜
]
/∂x˜
σ′(x)− pi′(x)− ∂E
[
(1− γ)s+(x,X∗) | X˜ = x˜
]
/∂x− ∂E
[
γs+(x,X∗)|X˜ = x˜
]
/∂x
=
∂E
[
γs+(X, x
∗) | X˜ = x˜
]
/∂x˜
σ′(x)− pi′(x)− ∂E
[
s+(x,X∗) | X˜ = x˜
]
/∂x
.
We first investigate the term σ′(x). Recall
σ(x) ≡ N
∫ c¯
0
[1− FC|X=x(s)]N−1ds− (N − 1)
∫ c¯
0
[1− FC|X=x(s)]Nds.
Taking the derivative of σ(x) with respect to x, we obtain
σ′(x) = −N(N − 1)
∫ c¯
0
∂FC|X(s|x)
∂x
[1− FC|X(s)]N−2FC|X(s)ds > 0,
where the last line is due to the assumption of stochastic dominance on FC|X . The
properties in Assumption B.3 then lead to the conclusion that α′(·) > 0. 
The proof of existence in this section is derived under the simplification that the
procurer’s price ceiling is not binding in the auction. The result can be extended to
the case with a binding price ceiling. Let the price ceiling be r ∈ (0, c¯), we present the
expression of β(c, x;α) and ϕ(x;α) while omitting the details for the proof of existence
because it is qualitatively the same as the case with a non-binding price ceiling.
β(c, x;α) =
 c− δ(x;α) +
∫ r
c
[1− FC|X(s)]N−1ds
[1− FC|X(c)]N−1 , c ≤ r
0, c > r.
ϕ(x;α) = −r[1− FC|X=x(r)]N + δ¯(x;α)
[
(1− FC|X=x(r))N − 1
]
+ NE[C(1:N−1)|X = x]− (N − 1)E[C(1:N)|X = x].
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C Identification Proofs
C.1 Proof of Observational Equivalence
In this section we provide a detailed argument for the observational equivalence of the
two models θ and θ0 mentioned in Section 3. The first step is to relate the equilibrium
strategy in θ to that in θ0. Let α(·; θ) : X → X denote the procurer strategy under θ in a
symmetric monotone psPBE; and likewise define α(·; θ0). Let α, α˙ be shorthands for α(x˜)
and α′(x˜) respectively. Recall that in equilibrium the procurer’s strategy α(·; θ) solves
the ordinary differential equation (ODE):
α˙ =
δ2(α, x˜; θ)
σ′(α; θ)− pi′(α)− µ1(α, x˜; θ)− δ1(α, x˜; θ) ≡ λ(α, x˜) (C.1)
for some initial condition α(x˜0; θ) = x0, where µ, δ, σ are defined above. We highlight
the dependence of µ, δ, σ on θ throughout this subsection. While µ and δ depend on
{γ, pi, a, FX∗,X˜}, σ : X →R only depends on FC|X in θ. Likewise, α(·; θ0) solves an ODE
similar to (C.1), only with θ therein replaced by θ0:
α˙0 =
δ2(α0, t; θ0)
σ′(α0; θ0)− pi′0(α0)− µ1(α0, t; θ0)− δ1(α0, t; θ0)
(C.2)
and a corresponding initial condition. By construction, FC|X = HC|X and FX∗|X˜=x˜ =
HX∗|X˜=h(x˜) for all x˜ ∈ X . Hence σ′(·; θ) = σ′(·; θ0) and
µ(·, h−1(t); θ) = µ(·, t; θ0) and δ(·, h−1(t); θ) = δ(·, t; θ0) (C.3)
for any t ∈ T . Substitute (C.3) into the ODE for θ0 in (C.2) gives:
α˙0 =
δ2(α0, h
−1(t); θ)
σ′(α0; θ)− pi′(α0)− µ1(α0, h−1(t); θ)− δ1(α0, h−1(t); θ)
(
dh−1(t)
dt
)
(C.4)
for any t ∈ T . To establish the relation between α(·; θ) and α(·; θ0), we need to show the
following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma C.1 Let ζ : T → X be an increasing differentiable function, where T , X are
open sets in a Euclidean space. If α(x˜) solves the ODE “α˙ = λ(α, x˜), x˜ ∈ X” with an
initial condition α(x˜0) = x0, then α0(t) ≡ α(ζ(t)) solves “α˙0 = λ(α0, ζ(t))ζ ′(t), t ∈ T ”
with an initial condition α0(ζ
−1(x˜0)) = x0.
Proof of Lemma C.1. By the definition of α(x˜) as a solution to the first ODE, we have
α′(x˜) = λ(α(x˜), x˜) for all x˜ ∈ X . If α0(t) ≡ α(ζ(t)) for all t ∈ T , then α′0(t) = α′(ζ(t))ζ ′(t)
for all t ∈ T . Combining the two equalities, we have α′0(t) = λ(α(ζ(t)), ζ(t))ζ ′(t) for all
t ∈ T . With α0(t) ≡ α(ζ(t)), this equality can be written as α′0(t) = λ(α0(t), ζ(t))ζ ′(t) for
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all t ∈ T . Finally, note α(x˜0) = x0 and α0(t) = α(ζ(t)) implies α0(ζ−1(x˜0)) = α(x˜0) = x0
This proves the lemma. 
An application of Lemma C.1 to (C.4) with ζ ≡ h−1 and λ(α, x˜) defined on the
r.h.s. of (C.1) implies the procurer equilibrium strategies under θ0 and θ are related as
α(t; θ0) = α(h
−1(t); θ) for all t ∈ T .
Next, note that the joint distribution of (X∗, X) at (x∗, x) according to θ is FX∗,X˜(x
∗, α−1(x; θ))
while that under θ0 is HX∗,X˜(x
∗, α−1(x; θ0)). The relation between α(·; θ) and α(·; θ0) im-
plies that α−1(x; θ0) = h(α−1(x; θ)) for all x ∈ X . Hence
HX∗,X˜(x
∗, α−1(x; θ0)) = HX∗,X˜(x
∗, h(α−1(x; θ))) = FX∗,X˜(x
∗, α−1(x; θ))
where the second equality is due to the specified relation between FX∗,X˜ and HX∗,X˜ .
Therefore the two joint distributions of (X∗, X) in equilibrium under θ and θ0 are identical.
Let φ(x, x∗) ≡ pi(x∗) − pi(x) and φ0(x, x∗) = pi0(x∗) − pi0(x). Then that a = a0, pi = pi0
and γ = γ0 in θ and θ0 imply γφ+ (1− γ)a = γ0φ0 + (1− γ)a0 for all x, x∗. Furthermore,
a pair (X,X∗) leads to positive net surplus φ− a under θ if and only if it does so under
θ0. Hence the two models θ and θ0 imply the same probability of D = 1 given (X,X
∗),
and the same distribution of Y given D = 1 and (X,X∗) in equilibrium.
Finally, the distribution of prices quoted by contractors at equilibrium under θ is
determined by the distribution of costs FC|X as well as the expectation δ¯(X;α(·; θ)) ≡
E[γs+(X,X∗) | X;α(·; θ)]. By construction, FC|X = HC|X and γ(φ − a) = γ0(φ0 − a0).
Furthermore, the argument above already shows that the joint distribution of (X,X∗) in
psPBE is identical under θ and θ0. It then follows that θ and θ0 can generate the same
joint distribution of V , Y , D, X and X∗ in psPBE.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1.
We first show the identification of pi. Rewrite (7) as:
ϕ′(z;α∗)− pi′(z)
= − ∂
∂x
[(1− γ)pi(x)p(x, x˜)]x=z +
∂
∂x
[∫
ω(x)
(1− γ)[pi(t)− a(x, t)]dFX∗|x˜(t)
]
x=z
(C.5)
for any x˜, where z ≡ α∗(x˜) as in the text. Recall for any t ∈ ω(x), y(x, t) = (1−γ)a(x, t)+
γ[pi(t)− pi(x)]. Therefore, the second term on the r.h.s. above is
− ∂
∂x
[γpi(x)p(x, x˜)]x=z +
∂
∂x
[∫
ω(x)
{pi(t)− y(x, t)} dFX∗|x˜(t)
]
x=z
. (C.6)
Hence (C.5) can be written as
ϕ′(z;α∗)− pi′(z)
= −pi′(z)p(z, x˜)− p1(z, x˜)pi(z) + ∂
∂x
[∫
ω(x)
{pi(t)− y(x, t)} dFX∗|x˜(t)
]
x=z
, (C.7)
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for all z ∈ Xe, where p1(z, x˜) is the derivative of p(x, x˜) with respect to the first argument
evaluated at x = z and Xe is the equilibrium support for initial specifications {x : x =
α∗(x˜) for some x˜ ∈ X}. Recall that ω(x) ⊆ X ⊆ R. For now, suppose it can be partitioned
into three intervals (−∞, ι1(x)), (ι2(x), ι3(x)) and (ι4(x),∞). Then by Assumption 1-(d),
p1(z, x˜) = fX∗|x˜(ι1(z))ι′1(z)− fX∗|x˜(ι4(z))ι′4(z)
+fX∗|x˜(ι3(z))ι′3(z)− fX∗|x˜(ι2(z))ι′2(z).
Applying the Leibnitz Rule to the last term on the right-hand side of (C.7), we can write
(C.7) as:
ϕ′(z;α∗) = [1− p(z, x˜)]pi′(z) + pi(z) [fX∗|x˜(ι4(z))ι′4(z)− fX∗|x˜(ι1(z))ι′1(z)
+ fX∗|x˜(ι2(z))ι′2(z)− fX∗|x˜(ι3(z))ι′3(z)
]
+
0− [pi(ι4(z))− y(z, ι4(z))] fX∗|x˜(ι4(z))ι′4(z)−
∫
ι4(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|x˜(t)dt+
[pi(ι1(z))− y(z, ι1(z))] fX∗|x˜(ι1(z))ι′1(z)− 0−
∫ ι1(x)
y1(z, t)fX∗|x˜(t)dt+
[pi(ι3(z))− y(z, ι3(z))] fX∗|x˜(ι3(z))ι′3(z)− [pi(ι2(z))− y(z, ι2(z))] fX∗|x˜(ι2(z))ι′2(z)
−
∫ ι3(z)
ι2(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|x˜(t)dt (C.8)
for any z ∈ Xe. Next, note that for all x, x∗,
pi(x∗)− y(x, x∗) = pi(x∗)− γ[pi(x∗)− pi(x)]− (1− γ)a(x, x∗)
= pi(x) + (1− γ)[pi(x∗)− pi(x)− a(x, x∗)]
= pi(x) + (1− γ)s(x, x∗).
With s(x, x∗) = 0 at x∗ = ιk(x) for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, we have pi(ιk(z)) − y(z, ιk(z)) =
pi(z) + (1 − γ) · 0 for all z ∈ Xe. Substitute this into (C.8). Then for all z on the
equilibrium support of initial announcement Xe, we have
pi′(z) = [1− p(z, x˜)]−1
(
ϕ′(z;α∗) +
∫
ω(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)dt
)
. (C.9)
The r.h.s. of (C.9) only contains quantities directly identifiable from the data. To see
this, first note that by the monotonicity of α∗ and the normalization of the distribution
of X˜ we can identify x˜ = α∗−1(z). (That is, if z is the τ -th quantile of X, then α∗−1(z) is
recovered as the τ -th quantile of X˜) For any z ∈ Xe,
fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t) = fX∗|D=1,X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)× Pr(D = 1|X = z) for all t ∈ ω(z),
because D = 1 if and only if X∗ ∈ ω(z). Also, by construction, both y(z, t) and ϕ(z;α∗)
are directly identifiable for all z ∈ Xe and t ∈ ω(z). Thus pi′(·) is identified over the
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interior of Xe. With a local normalization pi(x) = 0 where x is the infimum of Xe, we
obtain a closed-form solution for pi: That is, for all x ∈ Xe,
pi(x) =
∫ x
x
{
[1− p(z, α∗−1(z))]−1
(
ϕ′(z;α∗) +
∫
ω(z)
y1(z, t)fX∗|X˜=α∗−1(z)(t)dt
)}
dz.
With pi recovered over Xe, we can recover the contractor’s bargaining power as:
γ =
y(x2, x
∗
2)− y(x1, x∗1)
φ(x2, x∗2)− φ(x1, x∗1)
using any two pairs (x1, x
∗
1) and (x2, x
∗
2) that satisfy Assumption 2. Then a is recovered
as
a(x, x∗) =
y(x, x∗)− γφ(x, x∗)
1− γ
for all x ∈ Xe and x∗ ∈ ω(x).
Finally, with γ, pi, a identified above, we can recover δ¯(x;α∗) ≡ E[γs+(x,X∗) | X =
x;α∗] for any x ∈ Xe. This in turn implies we can recover the contractors’ inverse bidding
strategy in equilibrium β∗−1(·, x;α∗), and consequently the cost distribution FC|X=x for
any x ∈ Xe.
D Further Details for Parametric Estimation
This model in Section 5.2 accommodates both contract and contractor heterogeneity
and includes additive structural errors ε, η. The following proposition establishes the
identification of this parametric model under mild support conditions of the explanatory
variables. We assume structural parameters are non-zero (that is, θr 6= 0 for r = 1, 2, ..., 6,
σ 6= 0 and λ 6= 0.)
Proposition D.1. In the model (13)-(14) with the specification (15)-(16), the structural
parameters {θj}j=1,...,6, λ, ρ and σ2 are identified if the support of [(x∗−x), x2, x∗2, x∗x,w]
has full rank.
We now sketch a proof of this identification result. To simplify presentation, we first
condition on the other explanatory variables in w (other than job) and suppress them in
the notation below. Let γk be shorthand for the bargaining power when job = k ∈ {0, 1}.
To begin with, expand the latent variable γkφ + (1 − γk)a + ε in the outcome equation
(13) into:
γk[θ1(x
∗ − x) + θ2(x∗ − x)× k + θ3(x∗2 − x2)]
+(1− γk)[θ4(x∗ − x) + θ5(x∗ − x)× k + θ6(x∗ − x)2] + ε
= β1 × (x∗ − x) + β2 × x2 + β3 × x∗2 + β4 × (x∗ − x)× k + β5 × (x∗ × x) + ε
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where
β1 ≡ [γkθ1 + (1− γk)θ4]; β2 ≡ [(1− γk)θ6 − γkθ3]; β3 ≡ [γkθ3 + (1− γk)θ6];
β4 ≡ [γkθ2 + (1− γk)θ5]; β5 ≡ −2(1− γk)θ6.
Likewise, also expand the latent variable in the selection equation (14) into
β˜1 × (x∗ − x) + β˜2 × x2 + β˜3 × x∗2 + β˜4 × (x∗ − x)× job+ β˜5 × (x∗ × x) + η
where
β˜1 ≡ θ1 − θ4; β˜2 ≡ −θ3 − θ6; β˜3 ≡ θ3 − θ6;
β˜4 ≡ θ2 − θ5; β˜5 ≡ 2θ6.
Recall the coefficients in a probit model are identified, provided the support of the ex-
planatory variables has full rank. Thus, in our model the variation in x and x∗ on the
equilibrium path helps us recover {β˜j : j = 1, ..., 5} (and therefore θ1 − θ4, θ2 − θ5and θ3,
θ6) from the conditional probability of incompleteness given x, x
∗ and job.
Next, note the expectation of the negotiated transfer conditional on x, x∗, job = 1, d =
1 is
(β1 + β4)(x
∗− x) + β2× x2 + β3× x∗2 + β5× (x∗× x) +E[ε | x, x∗, job = 1, d = 1] (D.1)
where the last conditional expectation is the inverse mill’s ratio evaluated at
(β˜1 + β˜4)× (x∗ − x) + β˜2 × x2 + β˜3 × x∗2 + β˜5 × (x∗ × x)
where {β˜j : j = 1, ..., 5} are already identified from the selection equation (14). It then
follows that we recover β1 + β4, β2, β3, β5 from (D.1) as long as the typical rank condition
holds.17 It then follows that γ1 = 1 + β5/β˜5 is identified. (In fact γ1 is over-identified
because we can also express γ1 as a function of θ3, θ6 and β3.)
By repeating this argument conditioning on job = 0, we can show that γ0 is also
over-identified. It only remains to show that θ1, θ2, θ4, θ5 are identified. To do this, note
that we have already recovered: (a) γ1θ1 + (1 − γ1)θ4 + [γ1θ2 + (1 − γ1)θ5] from the
outcome equation conditional on job = 1; (b) γ0θ1 +(1−γ0)θ4 from the outcome equation
conditional on job = 0; and (c) θ1− θ4 and θ2− θ5 from the selection equation (14). Thus
we can construct a linear system of four equations and four unknowns
γ0 1− γ0 0 0
1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 −1
γ1 1− γ1 γ1 1− γ1


θ1
θ4
θ2
θ5
 = r.h.s.
17The rank condition requires the support of x∗− x, x2, x∗2, x∗x and the mill’s ratio to have full rank.
This condition can be satisfied under mild conditions due to the nonlinearity of the mill’s ratio (even
when the selection equation does not involve any exogenous variable that is excluded from the outcome
equation). See the last but one paragraph on page 806 in Wooldridge (2010) (which starts with “As a
technical point, we do not ...”) for more detailed discussion.
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where the right-hand side consists of quantities that are already identified. The coefficient
matrix on the l.h.s. is non-singular for all γ0, γ1 ∈ [0, 1]. It then follows θ1, θ2, θ4, θ5 are all
identified. Finally, recall that the identification result above was shown by conditioning
on w, which means the bargaining power, as a function of characteristics w and the job
type, is identified for all values w and job. The identification of λ then follows from the
parametric form of γ(w, job;λ) and the full-rankness of the support of w.
E Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10-th pctile median 90-th pctile
Contract (Project)-level
number of observations 1293
number of bidders 4.531 2.272 2 4 7
engineer estimate 2.393 4.268 .304 .929 5.914
actual project size 2.33 4.206 .345 1.017 4.928
winning bid 2.29 4.421 .269 .872 5.339
transfer .172 .356 0 .037 .469
fringe of the winning bidder .489 .5 0 0 1
distance of the winning bidder 97.569 143.618 9.78 46.44 254.73
utilization of the winning bidder .125 .218 0 .005 .406
average fringe† .567 .292 0 .6 1
average distance† 107.66 98.743 23.717 81.2 213.429
Contractor (Auction)-level
number of observations 5862
submitted bids 2.623 16.276 .287 .9 5.537
fringe .622 .485 0 1 1
distance 102.894 143.431 12.78 55.4 255
utilization .112 .224 0 0 .387
minimal distance among rivals 43.161 57.341 4.5 25.32 97.43
minimal utilization among rivals .017 .075 0 0 .012
submitted bids 3.055 17.185 .288 .912 5.876
 The unit is million dollars.
† The average is taken for all bidders within an auction.
40
Table 2: Regression Results of Transfer
(1) (2) (3)
constant -0.0778** -0.0709* -0.112***
(0.0351) (0.0383) (0.0424)
act. size (X∗) -0.151*** -0.249*** -0.230***
(0.0372) (0.0411) (0.0416)
eng. estimate (X) 0.266*** 0.368*** 0.364***
(0.0332) (0.0371) (0.0372)
afri 0.0662 0.0376 0.0612
(0.0468) (0.0463) (0.0467)
nbid 0.00613 0.00518 0.00580
(0.00585) (0.00571) (0.00566)
job 0.138*** 0.147*** 0.142***
(0.0247) (0.0241) (0.0240)
eng. estimate∗ afri -0.180*** -0.229*** -0.236***
(0.0428) (0.0423) (0.0443)
eng. estimate∗ nbid -0.0224*** -0.0243*** -0.0197***
(0.00698) (0.00681) (0.00685)
eng. estimate ∗ job 0.0300** 0.0194 -0.00513
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0204)
act. size ∗ afri 0.112** 0.169*** 0.168***
(0.0457) (0.0451) (0.0477)
act. size ∗ nbid 0.0202*** 0.0228*** 0.0178**
(0.00742) (0.00725) (0.00728)
act. size ∗ job -0.0954*** -0.0890*** -0.0615***
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0226)
eng. estimate ∗ eng. estimate 0.00131*** 0.000687*** 0.000625***
(0.000184) (0.000205) (0.000224)
act. size ∗ act. size 0.000559** 0.00128*** 0.00151***
(0.000230) (0.000251) (0.000278)
auti 0.0653 0.0804
(0.0948) (0.0945)
eng. estimate ∗ auti -0.297*** -0.274***
(0.0796) (0.0790)
act. size ∗ auti 0.225*** 0.197**
(0.0833) (0.0827)
adis 0.000222*
(0.000130)
eng. estimate ∗ adis -0.0000504
(0.0000661)
act. size ∗ adis -0.0000310
(0.0000718)
N 1224 1224 1224
R2 0.889 0.896 0.898
adj. R2 0.888 0.894 0.896
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3: Regression results of expected payment
(1) (2) (3)
constant -0.0460 0.0583 0.104
(0.0872) (0.0972) (0.104)
eng. estimate 1.105∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0170)
eng. estimate2 0.0000175 0.000107 -0.000228∗
(0.000133) (0.000133) (0.000135)
afri -0.0465 -0.0574 -0.108
(0.117) (0.118) (0.115)
nbid 0.0151 0.0126 0.0121
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0140)
job -0.137∗∗ -0.145∗∗ -0.121∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0614) (0.0596)
eng. estimate ∗ afri 0.128∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0194)
eng. estimate ∗nbid -0.0490∗∗∗ -0.0484∗∗∗ -0.0487∗∗∗
(0.00314) (0.00312) (0.00302)
eng. estimate ∗job 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗
(0.00842) (0.00835) (0.00818)
auti -0.631∗∗ -0.613∗∗
(0.246) (0.239)
eng. estimate ∗ auti 0.150∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0283) (0.0274)
adis -0.0000780
(0.000302)
eng. estimate ∗adis 0.000299∗∗∗
(0.0000347)
N 1306 1306 1304
R2 0.977 0.978 0.979
adj. R2 0.977 0.978 0.979
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Estimates of Average Marginal Effects on Bargaining Power
(1) (2) (3)
nbid 0.139∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.026)
afri -0.447∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.201) (0.081)
auti 0.507∗∗ 0.186∗∗
(0.215) (0.076)
adis -0.0002
(0.0014)
job type 1 0.624∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.094) (0.063)
job type 0 ♠ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.063) (0.031)
job† -0.291∗∗∗ -0.109 -0.117∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.068)
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
 Average bargaining power for job type 1.
♠ Average bargaining power for job type 0.
†Difference of average bargaining power for two job types.
Table 5: Estimates of Surplus and Cost Functions
(1) (2) (3)
Surplus function φ(·)
X∗ −X -2.837∗∗ -2.942∗∗ -2.916∗∗
(1.169) (1.160) (1.214)
(X∗ −X) ∗ job 0.050 0.905 0.175
(0.169) (1.002) (0.933)
X∗2 −X2 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Cost function a(·)
(X∗ −X) -0.837 -0.943 -0.916
(0.798) (0.794) (0.843)
(X∗ −X) ∗ job 0.413 -1.368 0.637
(1.216) (1.114) (1.037)
(X∗ −X)2 1.565∗∗∗ 1.565∗∗ 1.565∗∗
(0.589) (0.589) (0.589)
observations 1224 1224 1224
log-likelihood -3007.286 -2795.490 -2665.141
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Regression results of probability of incompleteness
(1) (2) (3)
constant 0.997∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.273) (0.275)
eng.estimate 2.149∗∗∗ 1.798∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.410) (0.417)
job 0.226 -0.403 -0.391
(0.256) (0.512) (0.512)
eng.estimate∗ job 1.309 1.287
(0.968) (0.967)
eng.estimate∗eng.estimate -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗
(0.00529) (0.00675)
observations 1306 1306 1306
correctly classified  94.10% 94.10% 94.10%
log-likelihood -246.72 -245.81 -245.70
pseudo R2 0.157 0.160 0.161
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Correctly classified: Pr(predicted D = j|observed D = j) ≥ 0.5, j = 0, 1.
Table 7: Estimates of markups
25-th qtile median 75-th qtile mean
job
1 1.07% 1.90% 3.71% 6.21%
0 1.17% 2.08% 4.17% 10.83%
winning bidders Yes 3.41% 6.87% 14.25% 29.13%
No 0.99% 1.63% 2.69% 3.22%
fringe Yes 1.07% 1.86% 3.67% 9.16%
No 1.23% 2.27% 4.47% 8.83%
utilization 0 1.03% 1.83% 3.49% 10.60%
(0, 0.3) 1.35% 2.48% 4.90% 7.07%
[0.3, 1] 1.09% 1.97% 4.12% 6.29%
distance [0.1, 11.9] 1.15% 2.17% 4.91% 7.23%
[12, 247.9] 1.14% 1.99% 3.96% 9.26%
> 247.9 0.94% 1.89% 3.93% 9.04%
number of bidders
2 3.42% 5.36% 9.85% 25.35%
3, 4, 5 1.58% 2.45% 4.61% 9.94%
6, 7, 8 0.87% 1.30% 2.23% 5.09%
8+ 0.66% 1.01% 1.81% 3.25%
overall 1.12% 2.00% 4.04% 9.03%
45
Table 8: Estimates of markups (assuming away incompleteness)
25-th qtile median 75-th qtile mean
job
1 2.14% 3.83% 7.85% 13.09%
0 2.39% 3.82% 7.77% 20.47%
winning bidders
Yes 7.69% 13.92% 27.76% 61.70%
No 1.96% 3.08% 4.95% 5.16%
fringe
Yes 2.05% 3.36% 6.90% 17.01%
No 2.76% 4.58% 8.89% 18.52%
utilization
0 2.01% 3.35% 6.67% 18.51%
(0, 0.3) 2.93% 4.87% 9.56% 18.17%
[0.3, 1] 2.47% 4.30% 8.24% 12.19%
distance
[0.1, 11.9] 2.36% 4.17% 9.48% 48.17%
[12, 247.9] 2.27% 3.76% 7.40% 14.65%
> 247.9 2.32% 4.16% 8.78% 10.70%
number of bidders
2 6.48% 10.35% 19.84% 29.10%
3, 4, 5 3.07% 4.74% 8.97% 21.84%
6, 7, 8 1.74% 2.50% 4.30% 11.29%
8+ 1.02% 1.64% 3.27% 5.67%
overall 2.29% 3.82% 7.78% 17.60%
